The escalating conflict between former premier Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamed and his chosen successor Datuk Seri Abdullah Badawi is the latest of the crises that tend to emerge among leading members of Malaysia's ruling party, UMNO.

This recurrence begs questions about the party's brand of stability, and amounts to a challenge that may become as destructive as the conflict in 1987 that literally split the party, as well as that in 1998 between Tun Dr Mahathir and his deputy Datuk Anwar Ibrahim.

Paradoxically, this history of conflicts within UMNO reveals better than anything else its dominance over Malaysian politics. The party has succeeded to such an extent that opposition, and democracy, has to be intra-Malay phenomena to be effective. Only UMNO leaders can effectively threaten UMNO, and only UMNO leaders can effectively criticize UMNO.

The rebuilding of Malaysia after the racial riots of 1969 was, in the eyes of the rebuilders such as Tun Abdul Razak Hussein and Tun Dr Ismail Abdul Rahman, a thorough attempt to redress socioeconomic conditions inherited from the colonial economy. This effort also involved the construction of a new consociation to replace the Alliance.

Throughout the decade preceding the fateful 1969 general elections, the administration had its hands full dealing with security issues as exemplified by Indonesian aggression and Communist insurgency, as well as the painful failed attempt to incorporate Singapore into the Federation of Malaysia. Political opposition between 1957 and 1969 was therefore dynamic, and fatefully not burdened by inter-ethnic sensibilities. Then came 1969.

Two major consequences as far as "political oppositionism" is concerned developed out of the riots.

The first was that the government was determined that such an episode should not be repeated. While this "never again" mentality led to a thorough socioeconomic analysis of the causes, it did not lead to measures that were as thoroughly thought through. Quantitative goals were adopted, and the tools chosen were meant to be tweaked along the way.

Lines of thought favoring preferential treatment for bumiputras, without a responsive system of checks and balances, meant that racial considerations infiltrated most aspects of socioeconomic and political life.

The second was that the earlier understanding between Alliance members was nullified by UMNO leaders, who were convinced that radical changes in democratic structure had to be carried out. Other parties, which continued to remain "neither alive nor dead" in the words of Tun Dr Ismail, were welcome to participate, but largely in supportive roles.

The Barisan Nasional thus came into being to facilitate UMNO's new ambitions, with all other members, which included erstwhile opposition parties, having inferior positions from the start.

Where the parties that decided to remain in opposition were concerned, the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill passed on 3 March 1971 limited what they were allowed to discuss and debate. These issues concerned citizenship, the national language and the use of other languages, the special position of the Malays, legitimate interests of non-Malays, and the sovereignty of the sultans were forbidden. Some members of the dwindling opposition proclaimed that the newly recalled parliament had, in passing the Bill, effectively "cut its own tongue."

The return to parliamentarianism was hastened by the fact that both Tun Razak and Tun Dr Ismail, the major architects of the rebuilding process, were men suffering from serious ailments. Tun Razak had leukemia and was living on borrowed time, while Tun Dr Ismail had a leaky heart valve, which could fell him at any moment. These men were therefore desperately cutting corners in bringing emergency rule to an end before death caught up with them. Democracy would most probably have remained dead should they suddenly have passed away.

The laws passed, the quantitative goals adopted, the reforming of UMNO and the ruling consociation, as well as the muffling of political debate, were all informed by their secret haste to dismantle their own dictatorship.

A permanent result of these measures was that UMNOÕs dominance became unchallengeable.

Although these two men managed to nail the new political infrastructure into place before they died, their premature passing, Tun Dr Ismail in August 1973 and Tun Razak in January 1976, nevertheless allowed younger leaders with other goals and other values to reinterpret their original plans.

The rise of UMNO from the ashes of May 13 was so powerful that strong opposition could not develop outside of it, but only from within. Malaysian democracy since 1969 has therefore been defined by this lopsided power equation. UMNO has reigned supreme, managing even in generating its own opposition.

Under Tun Dr Mahathir, Islam became increasingly important not only in flavoring the country's development, but also in defining the opposition.

In order to increase Malay domination of Malaysian politics, Tun Dr Mahathir sought to make UMNO's significant other, in other words, Malaysia's significant opposition, Malay. The rise of Islam in Malaysian politics and of the Islamist Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS) as the opposition during the Mahathir era stems from this. PAS was treated with more respect that its electoral standing warranted.

This focus on Islam allied Malaysia discursively to the Muslim world and offered an anti-Western position that suited Tun Dr Mahathir's worldview well. The Muslimness of the Malays started becoming more important than their Malayness. This further diminished the space available to both non-Malay government allies as well as opposition parties.

Playing with Islamism was also playing with fire, as shown in the 1999 elections when PAS managed to capitalize on the break-up between UMNO's two top leaders. The gains PAS made on that occasion quickly withered away. However, that break-up became a non-issue after Tun Dr Mahathir resigned in 2003. PAS lost badly in the 2004 general elections, and UMNO's dominance became obvious again.

Tellingly, for UMNO members, and especially for UMNO's president, who is also Malaysia's Prime Minister, tension constantly exists between their being Malay Muslims and being Malaysians. No doubt the reality of one overlaps that of the other, but describes it only partially and unsatisfactorily.

The clash of the personalities and the policies of Tun Dr Mahathir and Datuk Seri Abdullah showcases the internal tension and hubris that UMNO, by virtue of its hegemonic power, must always suffer from. More starkly, it reminds us of the impotence of opposition politics in Malaysia.