A singular Southeast Asian identity has always been elusive. The heterogeneous histories and political trajectories of the region's nation-states, spaced out by peninsulas and archipelagos, do not make the search for a coherent regional identity an easy one. However, it is this very search, politically motivated of course, as all identity formations are, that has emerged in recent years to mobilise the minds of Southeast Asian politicians, intellectuals and opinion-makers alike.

There are good reasons for this recent interest in regional identity. On a broad level, globalisation has led to regionalism. Regional formations like the European Union and South America's Mercosur have emerged as state-led responses to global challenges and trends. Similarly for Southeast Asia, the conventional wisdom is that a cohesive block would fare better against the rise of China and India than would scattered and uncoordinated economies.

Certainly, two significant initiatives within ASEAN have fuelled optimism for identity-formation. The first being the three proposed communities - economic, security, and socio-cultural. These three communities, while nascent, are meant to provide different platforms for collaboration, thus leading to deeper regional integration. The second initiative, the proposed ASEAN Charter, slated for induction by 2007, will offer member states much needed institutional infrastructure.

Both these initiatives, however, still have a long way to go. For example, there are worries that the ASEAN economic community will be complicated by individual states embarking on bilateral FTAs, sometimes for good reason, instead of moving in unison, resulting in the "spaghetti bowl effect". With regard to the Charter, there is debate whether it would endow ASEAN with a legal character and clear operational procedures, or be steeped in complicated language that reinforces the status quo.

Given such obstacles, it is no surprise that scholars like Don Weatherbee, Emeritus Professor of South Carolina University, argue that there is no ASEAN identity. ASEAN is, instead, only one among the many identities of its ten member states. I suggest that ASEAN has multiple identities; the cause of which is the undefined character of the Secretariat. Although the evolving ASEAN Secretariat is increasingly an important institution of ASEAN, its lack of an institutional identity has affected the public face of the association.

As it stands, the ASEAN Secretariat lacks the executive powers of the European Commission (EC), and relies more on the foreign ministers of member states to set the agenda. The EC, in contrast, is independent of national governments and is tasked with upholding the interests of the European Union (EU) as a whole. Civil servants appointed to the EC are loyal to both Europe and to their respective countries, and distinguish clearly between EU and national concerns. This clear demarcation of interests, as well as the concentration of powers, allow the EC to represent the EU on the international stage while operating as an, albeit overly bureaucratic, decision-making institution.

Until ASEAN has an independent "nerve-centre styled" institution comparable to the EC, its approach to both internal and external challenges will remain ad hoc, as dictated by competing and sometimes, even contradictory national interests. After all, without an authoritative decision-making body, it is only natural for member states to use ASEAN as a proxy to further national interests. ASEAN's ad hoc approach has resulted in an unpredictable mode of response.

Myanmar is a case, in point. ASEAN cannot decide what to do with Myanmar. Views are split between those who want to get tough on the junta and leave it to face international consequences, and those who press for continued engagement. While it is not unusual, indeed even healthy, to have diverse views within the association, the absence of a strong decision-making body has allowed routine differences to characterise ASEAN as a hesitant grouping handicapped by a head full of different voices.

Another type of ASEAN identity in danger of forming is a class-based one. While it is inevitable that ASEAN's key players such as diplomats, academics, and journalists will be found in regions’ capital cities, it is equally important that intellectual input into ASEAN also emanate from the grassroots. This is where the ASEAN People's Assembly (APA), a diverse group of NGOs and think tanks, comes in. The APA's role is crucial to identity-formation because it offers an insight into the lives and plight of the rural, the marginal and the poverty-stricken, these of which still form the majority of Southeast Asia's 500 million population.

Although civil society groups have developed the practice of meeting ASEAN leaders at the sidelines of summits and meetings, more must be done to institutionalise NGO-ASEAN engagement in order to generate policy inputs from the grassroots. Unless this is done, ASEAN would be little more than an abstraction to the region's farmers, migrant workers, ethnic minorities, women and children. Eventually, ASEAN identity will be synonymous with the interests and concerns of the region's small cosmopolitan vocal upper-middle class.

Without a strong Secretariat or a clear Charter to serve as an anchor for an ASEAN identity, there will be a tendency for external elements to define us. Take for example Australia's refusal to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) adopted by ASEAN members, China and several other Asian countries in the run up to the 2005 East Asia Summit. Australia claimed that the TAC was out of date and that events have "moved past" such a treaty. This only served to galvanise ASEAN to stand its ground and, in the process, foster a common bond. This form of identity is defined by contrast - you are who you are because of what you are not. It is primordial and thus natural, but it also implies a constantly shifting identity because it is dependent on capricious external forces for definition.

Lastly, the absence of a strong Secretariat or Charter leaves ASEAN identity open to the interpretation of member states. ASEAN identity becomes a powerful discourse that is whipped up in order to justify certain political interests. We believe in "non-interference" not because we are cordial Asians but because interference is messy, expensive and may even expose our own sins. The characteristics of our identity become little more than excuses to explain the status quo, or worse, avoid doing what needs to be done. A well-formulated Charter, underpinned by an effective Secretariat, will be needed for ASEAN to cope with the challenging times ahead.