The streets of Bangkok have famously provided a venue for “People’s Power” campaigns, most recently evidenced in September 2006. These same streets have provided the backdrop for soldiers and tanks in putsches that have marred Thai political history since 1932, when a constitution was introduced for the first time in the country. In its current form however, Thailand’s street politics bear a striking undemocratic semblance that poses a danger to the country’s development.
Despite lower house elections just six months ago, Thailand is now confronting yet another major round of street-based anti-government protests that have renewed the brinkmanship game that led to the last military coup in September 2006. The People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), revolving around the Manager Media Group and limited segments of civil society, has revived its street demonstrations over the past month, laying siege to Government House and demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej and his People Power Party-led government.
When the PAD began its street-based campaign almost three years ago in an effort to uproot the regime of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, it confronted overwhelming odds under adverse circumstances. In more than four years in office, Thaksin’s then one-party government had methodically co-opted, monopolised and manipulated the 1997 constitution. Its tentacles spread in all directions, from the police and military to the media, parliament and political party system. The economy was parlayed for cronyism and rents. Thailand was firmly in Thaksin’s grip to milk as he pleased. While its extra-parliamentary means of ousting a democratically elected government in the streets came into question, the PAD’s overall objective of overthrowing a disguised authoritarian leadership generated widespread sympathy and support, especially in Bangkok and other urban centres.
Over the past several weeks, the PAD has been at it again. This time, however, the circumstances are markedly different.
The balance of forces between those who favoured the September 2006 coup and those who continue to support Thaksin through the PPP-led government of Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, is much more even. The various constitutional bodies to check graft and deter abuses of power, including the National Counter Corruption Commission, the Election Commission and the Constitution Court, are being steered mostly by pro-coup and coup-associated individuals. Not all of them are anti-Thaksin but most of them were and are supportive of the putsch. They represent the coup-makers’ latent power. The PAD’s street protests this time are thus misguided and ill-advised.
Yet going into its second month, the PAD still refuses to go away despite a growing lack of broad-based support that was seen in 2005-06. Every step along the way since it retook the streets, the PAD has provoked heavy-handed government responses in order to lay the conditions for an extra-constitutional, extra-parliamentary intervention. It has blatantly argued for “soldiers to come out”, and has grossly distorted and manipulated news and events for its own ends, launching into character assassinations and criticisms against everyone who posit opposing and contrarian views, all in the name of “rescuing the nation”.
In so doing, the PAD has ironically morphed into the very object of condemnation upon which it initially built its reputation. Prior to his ouster, Thaksin was roundly despised and rejected for his influence over and outright capture of political institutions and constitutional mechanisms. In other words, he monopolised Thai politics so firmly that it engendered extra-parliamentary street demonstrations that paved the way for extra-constitutional change. The PAD is now hijacking Thai democracy in the same fashion the same way Thaksin’s authoritarian tendencies and political party machine monopolised it. The extremist movement tolerates no dissent. It is either the PAD’s way or the wrong way, which ranges from pro-Thaksin accusations and lack of loyalty to the throne, to questions of patriotism.
To be sure, the PAD is in a hurry to topple the Samak government because the street demonstrations are expensive and at risk of exhaustion. If the PAD cannot quickly force the issue and seal the game by pressuring Samak to resign or by inviting outside intervention, it risks fizzling out. For the government’s part, Samak and his key lieutenants have been just as belligerent and defiant in return, fanning the PAD’s flames. The brinkmanship game between the PAD and the Samak government has now reached a crescendo. Something will soon have to give. The PAD would have to back off or Samak would have to budge by resigning alone or along with his ministers. Otherwise the escalating face-off between the two sides will increase pressure for outside intervention from the military.
As it now appears that the PAD has political and financial backing from the highest corridors of power, the street demonstrations are likely to continue indefinitely. And the PAD’s street noises are having their intended impact on Samak. His tenure appears increasingly untenable, notwithstanding the successful defeat of a no-confidence motion in parliament on 27 June. Few doubt whether Samak can withstand the PAD’s maelstrom much longer without resorting to a hard-line response, which would spell his demise in any event. The just-concluded censure debate, where the government’s policy missteps and alleged conflicts of interest were widely exposed, will pile more pressure on Samak. At minimum, he will have to undertake a major cabinet reshuffle, but that will not be enough for the PAD. The endgame of his downfall is being played out against Samak’s will.
Yet what really plagues the Samak government is less the PAD than the growing economic hardship and standards-of-living issues. Many of the street demonstrators, numbering upto five digits during peak periods, are disaffected by rising energy and food prices, and the lack of effective policy responses. As a result, the PAD has gained some foot soldiers from the agricultural sector and state enterprise unions. Some of the non-PAD protesters have also staged their own shows separate from the PAD. Several large mob groups have occupied areas near Government House. The air of anarchy and inevitable confrontation is palpable.
This precarious environment has called the military’s role into question. Samak is seen as close to Army Chief General Anupong Paochinda, who still insists on staying out of the fray. But his colleagues in the regional commands and elsewhere, especially the first army region with jurisdiction over Bangkok, are playing their cards closer to their chests. In view of the lacklustre coup the last time, the army is unlikely to come out again, unless there is unmanageable violence in the streets which the government and the police cannot handle.
Such a military intervention could come in two related ways. First, the army could simply impose limited martial law through the Samak cabinet’s emergency decree in the affected areas of Bangkok. The other would be another outright seizure of power, resetting the democratic game all over again. This is what the PAD apparently has been egging the army to do. But even if violence spirals out of control, it will be confined to a few areas of Bangkok. A coup would be unnecessary.
General Anupong is not seen as pro-coup, but his immediate subordinates in key commands may have other ideas. Samak has himself to blame for not being more competent on policy fronts and for exacerbating the tit-for-tat battle between his government and the PAD. His position is now shaky, and the PAD will keep gnawing at his personal credibility and his administration’s eroding legitimacy. His term will be shortened correspondingly.
This will serve as a bad precedent and a blow to Thailand’s topsy-turvy democracy. Samak’s government deserves scrutiny in parliament and through constitutional channels and mechanisms, but not through the PAD’s rabid and reckless street campaign. If it succeeds in ousting the Samak government, the PAD’s street power will be a major setback for Thai democracy.