Relations between Thailand and Cambodia recently turned frigid following Phnom Penh’s decision to nominate the Hindu temple of Preah Vihear, known in Thai as Phra Viharn, as a United Nations World Heritage site. This ancient spiritual site was once contested by both nations. Thailand and Cambodia claimed sovereignty over the temple and finally took their bitter dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1962. Thailand lost as the court ruled that the Hindu temple belonged to Cambodia.
But the verdict of ICJ has not really ended the territorial conflict surrounding the location of the Hindu temple. Although Preah Vihear is situated inside Cambodian territory, it is only accessible from the Thai side of the border. The other point of contention that remains unresolved concerns the 4.6 square-kilometre area around the temple. Cambodia’s proposal to get the mountaintop temple on the UNESCO list of historical and cultural sites of global significance has resurrected the Thai fear of having to sacrifice the undemarcated border around the temple site. Thailand has requested the overlapping area be settled before Cambodia puts forward the temple as a potential UNCESCO world heritage site.
The current temple spat is an apt reflection of the nature of Thai-Cambodian relations. As immediate neighbours, their relations have been marked by conflict rather than cooperation. History has played some part in shaping this inimical attitude, ever since the Siamese army conquered the Khmer capital in 1353. Cambodia often looks at its bigger brother on its eastern border as a historic enemy who stole its cultural identity and blemished its national pride.
Today, Thailand is perceived as continuing to exploit Cambodia through its vast investments, which, as certain Cambodians claim, only benefit Thai businesses, godfathers and greedy politicians. Such economic exploitation has also instigated a moral crisis among Cambodians through the many lucrative Thai-owned casinos along the border, inside Cambodia.
At the state level, Thailand has driven several cooperative institutions, which include Cambodia, such as the ACMECS (Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy), hoping to reduce development gap between itself and other less developed Southeast Asian members. Through these, Thailand has offered financial and technical assistance to Cambodia as well as a variety of exchange programmes between their civil servants.
Such Thai initiatives have however been received with a mixed response from Cambodia. Since feelings of mistrust, now and in the past, have never actually subsided, some in Cambodia consider the Thai initiatives as part of a hegemonisation of the region and a self-aggrandisement policy of successive Thai governments.
The Cambodian mistrust towards the Thais was well exemplified in January 2003 when the Royal Thai Embassy in Phnom Penh was burned down, following an alleged claim by a Thai actress that the Angkor Temple belonged to Thailand. The burning of the embassy was noteworthy for two reasons. First, never in the history of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) had one member’s diplomatic mission been ransacked and burned down in another member’s state. Second and more insidiously, the lootings of Thai commercial establishments were carried out with only minimal intervention from the state.
At first glance, the public riots against Thai citizens and properties seemed to be a direct consequence of Cambodian nationalism. But the timing of the attack on the Thai diplomatic mission was closely related to the Cambodian elections in early 2003. It is well reported that political killings, intimidation, voter coercion and vote buying routinely mar the Cambodian pre-election period. Various political factions seek to secure power at any cost, even at the expense of damaging relations with Cambodia's neighbours. Some speculated that nationalism was a part of the electoral strategy of the ruling party, whose members put on its patriotic armour in order to protect “the national interest” in the face of foreign influence.
Many Thai government officials understand that it is this very same nationalistic strategy that is being employed in the case of Preah Vihear, especially when the next elections in Cambodia are around the corner. The Thai army, in particular, has been led to believe that Cambodia intends to claim the disputed area through the creation of “false historical evidence.” Needless to say, Thailand’s military was alerted to protect Thai sovereignty even through the use of force.
The fact that Thailand is experiencing political turmoil at home may not contribute positively to any peaceful resolution. It would be too damaging for the ruling Thai elites to back away from their role as national defenders. Even worse, the current Thai government has been accused of conceding to Cambodia’s proposal in exchange for Phnom Penh granting oil and gas concessions to former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.
At the regional level, ASEAN, with its failure to prevent the escalating violence against Thai institutions in Cambodia five years ago, has continuously been treated with little significance when it comes to dispute settlement among members. Since ASEAN has no formal norms governing the domestic behaviour of member states, bilateral or international solutions represent the only courses of action. This omission, not for the first time, will serve to deny member states a neutral facility to resolve conflicts. The animosity between Thailand and Cambodia over Preah Vihear could certainly do with a reduction in temperatures.
