Chinese President Hu Jintao began his five-day visit to Japan on Tuesday. This is the first visit by a Chinese head of state in a decade and it takes place as Beijing and Tokyo mark the 30th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship.
Sino-Japanese relations are at a crossroads as Asia’s two major powers reassess their political-strategic, economic/commercial, and societal-cultural ties that could in turn make them either the indispensable forces for stability or the arch rivals for dominance in East Asia.
The two countries have never been as interdependent as they are today, particularly economically. Bilateral trade has reached $236 billion (2007), making China Japan’s number one trading partner and Japan China’s third. Accumulated Japanese investment in China has surpassed $60 billion, the second largest source of foreign direct investment in China.
After five years of stagnation and free fall in their bilateral political relationship during 2001-2006 when Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi defied and alienated Beijing by his persistent visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, the two countries since late 2006 have gradually made amends and restored the process of high-level dialogue. Summit meetings are taking place more regularly; defence exchanges have resumed; and greater efforts are being made to address (even as they have yet to resolve) such issues as the East China Sea dispute.
President Hu’s visit provides a unique opportunity in not only restoring the trust and confidence that are needed for stable bilateral relations but also charting a new course for the two countries as they address the challenges and seek cooperation in the coming years. But in order to accomplish these goals, leaders in Beijing and Tokyo must overcome the legacies of history, manage and minimise existing conflicts, recognize and accept the new geo-strategic realities and each other’s aspirations, expand their economic ties, and lay the foundation for understanding between the two peoples.
Prime Ministers Shinzo Abe and Yasuo Fukuda have taken critical steps in defusing tension related to the most controversial and symbolically most sensitive issue—the Yasukuni Shrine. Fukuda in particular has pledged to not visit the shrine during his tenure. The two countries have also been engaged in more regular dialogue and consultation on the East China Sea dispute, seeking mutually acceptable solutions. While no easy solutions are in sight, at least both have shown interest in managing and minimising the negative impact of the dispute.
The historical and territorial issues, important as they are, could be viewed as both the causes and symptoms of the overall bilateral political relationship, which has been volatile, fragile, and at times estranged since the end of the Cold War. There are both structural and perceptual issues requiring new assessments and new strategies.
The structural realities are that China has experienced the most dramatic economic growth over the past three decades ever since the country embarked on economic reforms and opening up to the outside world. A country on the brink of economic collapse in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution, China today ranks fourth among the world’s economic powers in GDP and number two if one uses the purchasing power parity formula, surpassing Japan. It has the largest foreign exchange reserve in the world and ranks behind Germany as the second largest exporting country.
As China’s economy grows, so grows its military power and political influence. Rising Chinese defence expenditure and military modernisation raise questions if not alarms in Tokyo; Beijing’s active diplomacy—its “soft power” play—is winning friends in the region and beyond. China is clearly on the rise as a global power.
On the other hand, Japan, the second largest economy in the world for years, is looking for a greater political and diplomatic role on the international stage. Japan has over the decades been a major donor of economic assistance to the developing world, a major contributor to the United Nations, and in recent years has also become more active in international peace keeping missions. It also aspires to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
Tokyo and the new generation of politicians that govern Japan, are also seeking a normal state status for the country. This assertiveness, coupled with its renewed efforts in strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and a self defence force that for the first time has sent personnel overseas, likewise worries its neighbors, including China. Japan is actively supporting U.S. and deploying its own missile defence systems and developing its military space capacities.
Faced with such new realities, both Beijing and Tokyo need to recognise and accommodate each other’s aspirations even as they must dispel misperceptions and manage potential conflicts. This makes dialogue and communication all the more important to avoid unnecessary misgivings, suspicions, and outright hostility. As Asia’s two most important powers, their mutual acceptance and mutual trust in strategic terms are critical at a time when both countries are experiencing significant changes and transitions.
The growing economic ties have brought enormous benefits for both countries but have also generated disputes and concerns. Beijing and Tokyo should strive to strengthen their cooperation in financial stability, food safety, environmental protection and climate change, and energy efficiency, and support East Asian regionalisation. The two countries have much to gain if they develop long-term win-win partnership and much to lose if they allow themselves to be entrapped in a zero-sum game of blind competition, rivalry, and undermining each other’s position.
A healthy and sustainable bilateral relationship must also be built on a solid foundation of mutual understanding between the two peoples. The early 1970s to mid-1980s were described as the golden era of Sino-Japanese relations when both countries sought very hard and most sincerely to understand each other, to promote mutual trust and, most importantly, to pass on the torch of friendship to the new generations of politicians, opinion leaders, and the public. This remains the most fundamental task today. In this context, media in both countries could and should play a more positive role.
The future of Sino-Japanese relations is in the hands of younger generations. In the mid-1980s, 3,000 Japanese youths came to China at the invitation of then Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang. In recent years, such exchanges have been revived and promoted. But clearly more needs and should be done in this regard.
President Hu termed his visit to Japan as a “warm spring” journey that would herald in a new era of bilateral relationship based on mutual trust and long-term strategic interests. This is a lofty goal that the two countries could and should accomplish in their mutual interests and to the benefit of East Asia and beyond. After the deep freeze of years past, spring may have finally arrived in Sino-Japanese relations.