Outside observers who are confused and astonished by Thailand’s persistent turmoil ought to be forgiven. This is a country that not long ago was viewed as having consolidated its democratic rule. Yet for almost the past three years, it has been caught in a roller-coaster of street protests and political polarisation, a military coup, a new constitution, a general election just last December, and the return of more street protests, confrontation and brinkmanship.
The current focus of Thailand’s protracted crisis is the row over constitutional amendments. As they face the growing likelihood of dissolution for electoral fraud, three leading parties of the coalition government are fighting back by trying to revise the charter. The proposed amendments are still inconclusive but their overall objective clearly will be to sidestep and derail the draconian provisions stipulated in the 2007 constitution from the coup period last year.
At stake is the political survival of the People Power Party, the largest party widely seen as a proxy of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, and Chart Thai and Matchima Thipataya parties, two junior coalition partners. At issue are a clutch of charter articles mandating party dissolution for campaign fraud ranging from blatant vote-buying and in-kind bribery to outright voter intimidation. While such practices are endemic in Thai elections, the constitution drafters appointed by the coup makers were intent on extirpating them by law. Unsurprisingly, the forces that undermined Thaksin’s regime and underpinned the coup, centring on the People’s Alliance for Democracy, are dead set against the amendments. The brewing crisis over the constitution is fast redrawing battle lines between what Thaksin and his cohorts represent and the forces and interests of the Establishment.
Attempts to amend the charter vary. Some members of the ruling PPP as well as from Chart Thai and Matchima Thipataya parties have suggested selective revisions of key clauses, particularly Article 237 on party dissolution and Article 309 on the finality of all laws and policies enacted from the coup to the constitution’s promulgation. Others demand a wholesale rewrite of the charter on the grounds that its coup-associated status is illegitimate. Divergences also centre on certain clauses that impinge on Thaksin’s pending corruption cases. While disagreements over the charter changes are wide-ranging within and among the coalition government, it is clear that the parties in power will not sit idle while the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court adjudicate the electoral fraud cases against them. Timing is crucial. An extensive revision would take longer and may not outlast the courts’ decisions. The ruling parties need just a handful of supporters in the senate to garner the required bicameral majority in the 630-strong parliament to push through the amendments as long as they can agree on what to amend.
However, even a limited revision of a few articles will be opposed by the Democrat Party and the extra-parliamentary People’s Alliance for Democracy. The PAD played a critical role in laying the conditions for the putsch that ousted Thaksin in September 2006. The Democrats-PAD alliance – one partner in parliament while the other is street-based – is now in the open. The Democrats will throw their weight against all amendments raise by the governing parties. The PAD, on the other hand, insists on establishing another Constitution Drafting Assembly to oversee the amendments process. PAD leaders have threatened time and again to retake the streets in the event the charter changes are forced through by the PPP-led government. In the PAD’s favour is the unprecedented referendum that passed the charter in August 2007 by a 57-to-42 per cent margin, excluding invalid ballots.
The conundrum over the charter changes has brought up a new option for the PPP. It could dissolve the lower house, call a snap election within 60 days, and relocate to a new party within 30 days. This would allow party members to circumvent a dissolution verdict. However, Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, who has the authority to dissolve the lower house, is not in favour of this option because it will rob him of his premiership. Samak’s lack of a support base within the PPP has become conspicuous. If he relinquishes his post now, he is unlikely to become prime minister again. His potential dissolution of the lower house and a snap election will likely be a last resort to be deployed only if the PPP’s dissolution becomes imminent.
A compromise floated by Jaturon Chaisaeng, a former stalwart of Thai Rak Thai party, the PPP’s forerunner, to set up another constitution drafting assembly to vet the government-sponsored amendments, has made little headway. This option would appease the PAD and its allies, and could keep the ruling coalition’s intended charter changes on course. Its rejection brings up another dead end in the current spate of Thai politics. The upshot is more confrontation and brinkmanship. Indeed, the structure of Thailand’s political crisis and social conflict has not changed. It is still the formidable Bangkok-based minority revolving around the PAD-led coalition versus the upcountry silent majority underpinning the PPP and its bosses.
The proposed charter changes will cause fissures within the PPP and the coalition government as much as they will incur the wrath of the PAD and its middle-class supporters. Yet the PPP and its two coalition allies cannot allow the charter to work as intended because they increasingly confront the spectre of disbandment. To them, the charter is tantamount to constitutional coercion imposed posthumously by the military junta. A new round of Bangkok-based street protests pitting the same opposing forces with the same logic, objectives and interests seen over the last two years appears a matter of time.
