KMT Returns to Power in Taiwan


Copper

On March 22, voters in Taiwan picked Ma Ying-jeou, the candidate of the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT), for their new president. Ma and his running mate Vincent Siew won by nearly a 17 percent margin over Frank Hsieh and Su Tseng-chang, of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party.  

The ruling DPP won but five cities and counties, losing even Kaohsiung city were Frank Hsieh was once mayor. Underscoring the KMT win, Ma got more votes for president than anyone in Taiwan’s history of direct elections. Meanwhile two referendums on Taiwan rejoining the United Nations failed. This was also a DPP defeat as President Chen and the party had promoted its referendum strongly; the KMT had one but did not.

The election results were a surprise to many who thought Hsieh was closing the gap with Ma based on events that seemed to favor him in the final days. That was not the case. Most voters had already made up their minds.  

The issues that vaulted Ma and Siew to victory were poor governance and deep corruption on the part of the administration of President Chen Shui-bian and his party and credible promises Ma made to bring change. To the electorate, poor governance included a lack of leadership by Chen Shui-bian. Promised reforms were forgotten. Very little was accomplished in his eight years in office. Chen resorted to exacerbating ethnic hostility to rule and relations between Taiwan’s four ethnic or sub-ethnic groups plummeted.  

The DPP even carried campaign advertisements selling Hitler as a model for the youth. Mainland Chinese, who came to Taiwan after World War II, were called “pigs” and “traitors.” Aborigines were “black pigmies” who ruined Taiwan’s environment and should go to Central America, so said the vice president. Foreign wives were treated with disdain.

Press freedom declined according to Reporters Without Borders during Chen’s tenure. Guarantees of other basic freedoms were put on hold. Transparency in government, according to global organisations that measure that, diminished. Most citizens perceived that the Chen government did not consolidate democracy; rather he caused Taiwan’s democracy to devolve.  

Chen politicised the making of foreign and defense policy. Ethnic groups in disfavour were bypassed and that affected the chain of command because of less qualified people in authority. Top soldiers and members of the intelligence community also felt the sting of prejudice. A considerable number resigned. Some even defected to China.

Relations with the United States, Taiwan’s protector, deteriorated faster than at any time anyone could recall. Washington came to see Taiwan not as a loyal ally, but as a danger to peace in the region. Taiwan’s relations with China also went south.

The Chen administration similarly did not manage the economy well. After six months in power, Taiwan fell into recession. After a year Taiwan recovered, but its growth rate remained low compared to other Asian countries. Citizens felt poor. Doing business with China offered promise, but the Chen administration balked at this. Many businesses went anyway.

Chen lowered taxes to help the business community; this hurt poorer people who needed welfare help and enlarged the gap between rich and poor. The suicide rate went up as a result and other social ills worsened.

Finally, the Chen administration was rife with corruption. Running on a campaign to clean up the government, Chen did the opposite. According to polls taken two years after he became president, citizens saw the DPP as more corrupt than the KMT.

Then the situation went from bad to worse. A spate of Chen’s friends and associates were indicted and many were sentenced to jail. His son-in-law was sent to prison for insider trading. His wife, the First Lady, was indicted for forging government documents, stealing public funds, and perjury.

The press reported that she got immensely rich on illegal stock trading and arranging dirty business deals. The prosecutor who filed the indictment said President Chen was guilty of the same offenses, but as president could not be touched. During this campaign, Chen administration officials tried to set up a company to handle funds for arms purchases. The legislature saw this as a trick to plunder the country after the DPP left office and nixed it. There were other cases including an attempt to “privatise” the Grand Hotel. 

Hsieh and Chen were not friends. Hsieh expressed this publicly; but Hsieh had served as Chen’s premier. He could not distance himself from Chen very much during the campaign. President Chen remained active and was an albatross around Hsieh’s neck.

Hsieh also had to campaign on many of the same issues that brought Chen to power and that Chen still championed. He needed to appeal to voters on local identity issues. Hsieh is an astute politician and a good campaigner. He often appeared more energetic and charismatic then Ma. But citizens believed could fix the economy, rid the country of corruption, and would heal ethnic relations. Voters wanted the change Ma proposed and trusted him to do it.

 

John F. Copper is the Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. He is the author of a number of books on China and Taiwan, including the recently published, Playing with Fire: The Looming War with China Over Taiwan (Praeger: 2006).

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