Almost to the year of the North Korean nuclear test last October, the Six-Party Talks - the multilateral process aimed at defusing and resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis - reached an agreement that represents a major step towards the dismantlement of the North's nuclear weapons program.
The Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement, released at the end of the second session of the sixth round of the talks commits North Korea to "disabling" three main facilities at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, declaring all its nuclear activities by year's end, and reaffirming its commitment not to engage in nuclear transfers of any kind. In return, the other parties to the talks will provide economic, energy and humanitarian assistance to North Korea to the equivalent of one million tons of heavy fuel oil. In addition, the United States will fulfill its commitment to begin the process of removing the designation of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism and terminating the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, in parallel with North Korea's de-nuclearisation.
This is significant progress in the more than four years of on-and-off negotiations, and heightens hopes and expectations for the final resolution on the North Korean nuclear issue. What has led to the latest breakthrough, if not, closure? There are a number of obvious reasons.
One has been the more active diplomacy of all the participating states to the Six-Party Talks since North Korean nuclear test. In the past, China served as a key point of contact (and rightly remains so today) and a messenger, regularly engaging to consult with various parties. However, this time around, there have been more bilateral contacts between all the participating states.
A second has been the apparent adjustment of US policy towards North Korea and Washington's willingness to discuss issues of mutual concern directly with Pyongyang. US and DPRK representatives have held meetings in Berlin, New York, and Geneva, a departure from the more recent Bush administration's policy of not engaging in direct and bilateral discussions with North Korea. Separately, it is likely that last November's mid-term election loss also prompted the Bush administration to rethink its foreign policy legacy with Iraq weighing heavily against it.
A third critical factor was Pyongyang's decision to seize the opportunity to engage in meaningful dialogue rather than continue to engage in charged rhetoric. Given the difficulties it faced in the aftermath of its nuclear test and the ensuing international sanctions and its growing isolation, North Korea has incentives to reach agreement.
On 13 February 2007, the Six-Party Talks adopted an "action plan" for the implementation of the 19 Sep 2005 "Joint Statement" pursuant to which North Korea agreed to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, to commit to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In July 2007, North Korea began shutting down and sealing the main nuclear facilities at Yongbyon under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A US-led team of experts visited these facilities in September to devise specific measures for disablement and to make recommendations to the heads of the delegations. The experts' group will return to Yongbyon in the coming weeks.
The upbeat atmosphere was also apparent in another major event in early October - the second inter-Korea summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and ROK President Roh Moo-hyun, which also took another small, albeit important step in the long and at times, unpredictable road toward peninsular peace and reconciliation. The two leaders signed the "Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Relations, Peace and Prosperity," which pledges to expand and promote inter-Korean economic cooperation, establishes that the two countries will hold frequent meetings between "their highest authorities", enhances military confidence building, and facilitates reconciliation by expanding the "reunion of separated family members and their relatives."
While these are welcome developments and are likely go a long way towards de-nuclearisation in the Korean peninsula and reconciliation, the road to that destination remains bumpy. The parties concerned will need to anticipate and overcome several significant challenges.
One is the declaration of North Korea's nuclear programs, which was not clearly spelled out in the October joint statement. For one thing, Pyongyang has disavowed that it has a program for producing highly enriched uranium (HEU), which Washington believes it has, the very reason assistant secretary of state James Kelly was dispatched to Pyongyang to confront North Korean officials in October 2002, and the genesis of the second nuclear crisis on the peninsular.
Secondly, the precise definition of "disablement" and the proper mechanism to verify North Korea's declarations to the IAEA will need to be resolved before the final phase of the dismantlement process. Washington wants to make sure that after disablement and prior to dismantlement of North Korea's known nuclear facilities, it will be difficult for Pyongyang to restart the program. This is important if one recalls Pyongyang's move in 2003 to reprocess spent-fuel and re-activate its 5-megawatt graphite reactor, purportedly leading to the production of about 6-8 nuclear weapons worth of fissile material.
Third, after last October's nuclear test, the Bush administration redrew the red line threatening a strong US response should North Korea transfer nuclear material, technology and know-how to other countries. However, just before the latest session of the Six-Party Talks, reports emerged about suspected North Korean nuclear transfers to Syria. The subsequent Israeli attack only intensified the speculation. Indeed, conservatives are already questioning the administration's North Korea policy and some congressional Republicans are demanding for an explanation of the Syrian episode. Has Pyongyang crossed the red line already and if so, how should the administration react and what actions should be taken? But the more ominous question is - what credibility is there in the North Korean commitment?
The joint statement also caused concerns with regard to alliance cohesion. US ambassador to Japan, J. Thomas Schieffer, warned President Bush that the deal - especially with Washington contemplating the removal of Pyongyang from the State Department's list of countries sponsoring terrorist activities - could harm relations with Japan, with the abduction issue still unresolved. Indeed, Tokyo has decided not to provide aid to North Korea even though this is a major component of the multilateral deal.
Finally, during the North-South Summit, Seoul offered economic aid and development packages that reportedly run up to $11 billion, without requiring that Pyongyang make any progress toward de-nuclearisation in return. South Korea has agreed to fund major projects, expansion and establishment of industrial zones, and infrastructural improvements. The significant economic aid thus promised by South Korea without linkage to progress viz. North Korea's nuclear dismantlement and meaningful economic reform, could potentially undermine the goals of the Six-Party Talks, which expressly emphasise "action by action," i.e., economic aid is contingent upon progress with regard to de-nuclearisation.
All told, the latest breakthrough - if the implementation can be faithfully carried out - represents a major step towards the final abandonment of North Korea's nuclear program. However, challenges lie ahead. President Reagan's notable adage, "trust but verify," should continue to serve as the guiding principle to achieve that ultimate goal.