As the US considers the future of its military presence in Iraq and awaits the progress report by General David Petraeus and Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, the familiar chorus of withdrawal has begun to make its rounds once more - especially after the British handover of Basra and criticisms by senior British officials on the US post-war strategy, or lack thereof.
The disastrous Japanese occupation of China in the 1930s and 40s offers useful lessons to the United States as it determines an exit strategy. The reality of counter-insurgency and the prospect of Balkanisation in Iraq has made the development of a conceivable exit plan more urgent than ever.
Post-Saddam Iraq continues to lack a sustainable political order, and the continued presence of American troops is compounding this state of affairs. The US is being forced to revisit Iraq’s historical legacy and its ramifications last evidenced during the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. As was once in China, the disappearance of the Ottoman order in the Middle East has left local peoples with overlapping and competing ethnic, religious, sectarian, local, and class identities, none more evident in Baghdad.
Lacking the pre-invasion national identity, different groups in Iraq have not been able to reach agreements for settling social-political conflicts, particularly the disbursement of wealth, and the onward political and economic opportunities related to its allocation.
With the Japanese experience of World War II in China in mind, the Americans should withdraw from the nation-building process in Iraq, as they will otherwise inescapably shoulder the burden of Iraq’s domestic security for an extended period of time. Rather, an American role in the interim should be restricted to shielding Iraq from foreign infiltration, particularly from Iran, Syria, and al-Qaeda, in order to ensure the survival of the government in Baghdad.
The US can forget about the instantaneous creation of a national identity that is pliable to American interests. In order to not repeat Japan’s mistakes in China, the American policymaker must realise and be reminded that the utility of military power is very limited. Military instruments are effective only when they are employed to achieve well-defined, and hence limited, political objectives.
As Japan did in the 1930s, the U.S. has seriously underestimated national resistance after major military victories, naively believing that a military victory would automatically point to political triumph. Prior to the invasion of China, there existed the so-called “single-blow argument” in Tokyo, a Japanese version of what Americans called “shock and awe” in 2003. The single-blow strategy was not successful, and by the end of the Second World War, more than one million soldiers of the Japanese army had been embroiled in protracted counter-insurgency warfare in China for some 15 years. Major battles were very rare and, when they occurred, were only very brief. Japanese forces were mainly engaged in today ’s equivalent of peace-keeping operations, while faced with sporadic skirmishes and guerilla-styled, asymmetric attacks.
Initially, the Japanese government and people justified military operations in China as self-defence, including protection of Japanese civilian residents in China. Once entangled in China, Japan ’s rationale was changed to the noble cause of saving the Chinese people from the deepening chaos there and ensuring modernisation and prosperity. The protracted military presence, however, acted against this purpose. Whatever moral tone such a justification carried, Japanese forces ended up unmistakenly serving as an occupation army.
In 2003, the American people strongly supported the attack against Iraq as self-defense against Saddam ’s weapon of mass destruction. However, when no such weapons were found in Iraq, the Bush administration proclaimed that it had a duty to extend freedom and democracy to the Iraqi people. However, the very existence of one country’s army on the soil of another country over an extended period of time, if without genuine consent, will inescapably engender motivated resistance. This was the case in China seventy years ago, and it is the case in Iraq today.
With its forces bogged down in China, the Japanese leadership expanded the war across China and eventually, to the greater East Asian region as a whole. This strategic blunder resulted in continuous security challenges, and created an exhausting cycle of expansion, occupation, and expansion again. The Japanese leadership continuously raised the stakes of the expanding war, while no individual leader was willing to accept political responsibility for the unwinnable conflict in China.
Based in part upon reflection of the Japanese failures in China, Americans should reevaluate the idea of opening second and third fronts in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq. It is imperative that the United States avoid following the Rumsfeld approach of expanding a problem that cannot be solved.
The Bush administration approved a “surge” of its forces in Iraq; in January 2007, the US air force undertook a limited armed intervention in Somalia; and the US supported the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in summer 2006. It also faced a serious challenge from Iran. However, if the Bush administration continues to expand its definition of the problem in Iraq and attempts to solve it with purely military means, the United States will likely suffer horrific losses of human and economic resources, and critically, its global predominance and leadership will be irreversibly undermined.