Bishkek has not looked so spruce in years. Ahead of a landmark Eurasian summit opening on 16 August in the Kyrgyz capital the unpopular government has scraped out budgets to marshal legions of engineers, painters and gardeners.
So hard up is Kyrgyzstan that preparations for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit almost ground to a halt. Into the breach reportedly stepped China with $2 million. Beijing could hardly fail to pony up the cash given that the summit is a consequence of its initiative in 1996 to get Central Asia marching in step under the banner of the SCO.
The summit is a big deal for this remote, mountainous country rich in water and walnuts, which rarely gets to host such a gathering. It is also the biggest gathering of Eurasian states yet orchestrated by the six-member SCO. Mongolia, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Iran are sending senior figures observers or guests.
That in itself is something of a landmark for China's strategy, of which the SCO is a key plank, to promote trade and investment in Central Asia while trying to prevent civil upheaval in lands where poverty is not far off that culturing instability in west Africa. Beijing, for instance, hopes to open trade with Europe through Central Asia as an alternative to Russia.
Chinese firms, many controlled by Beijing, have sealed deals across Central Asia in recent years for oil and gas plus pipelines to China. Roads, railways and dams are also on the cards for a region where much infrastructure development remains oriented towards Russia.
Some observers dismiss the organisation's prospects, yet expansion from cooperation, albeit with modest measures, on security to trade suggests it may last longer and have a greater impact than some think. The SCO has, for instance, proved far more attractive to Central Asian states, including Kyrgyzstan, than NATO's empty partnerships-for-peace programme. Chinese, Kazakh and Russian troops and jets are conducting live-fire exercises in Russia during the summit.
Nevertheless prospects are tempered by the group's nature. Parallels with NATO or the European Union are hard to stand up. Ariel Cohen, an analyst at the Heritage Foundation, thinks the SCO is a vehicle for Sino-Russian dominance of Central Asia rather than the beginnings of a multilateral security organisation like NATO.
A more apt parallel, especially given the evolving economic aspect, for the SCO is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), celebrating its 40th anniversary this month. The SCO's scope and diversity echoes ASEAN, as does members' commitment to not meddle in each other's domestic affairs (often flouted in practice).
SCO summits, like those of ASEAN, rarely deliver policy bombshells. Instead as much as anything they are an opportunity for publicly reaffirming solidarity. Just getting leaders and lackeys together over a few banquets is valuable for building confidence and broadening possibilities. Moreover, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are still rather fragile, not to mention wary of major powers, and prickly at the prospect of domination by their giant neighbours. Deep cooperation and economic integration are still years away.
China, the rising power, and Russia, the dominant player, can probably wait. Neither wants to see the spoils of Central Asia cut three or four ways. For now that limits competition between China and Russia within the SCO's shadows of cooperation. "I remain sceptical because they still have major issues, but they seem to have reached some sort of tacit agreement to counter the west," says Niklas Swanstrom, associate professor of Eurasian studies at Uppsala University.
Fortunes turned their way when America harshly criticized Uzbekistan's crackdown on protests in Andijan in 2005. Uzbekistan promptly ordered the Americans to leave and then made up with Russia. Since then, China and Russia have turned their attention to Kyrgyzstan.
It is perhaps the greatest irony that summit participants stepping out for a cigarette or a little fresh air in Bishkek might, if they care to glance up, see arching across the skies not only Russia Sukhoi strike jets but also American tankers and transports supporting NATO operations in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, in an illustration of the riddles of Central Asian power plays, uniquely lets the Russians operate from Kant while less than 30 miles away, the Americans use Manas. Though for how much longer is questionable.
Russia has apparently been leaning hard on Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev to shut the American base, a call echoed by China and the SCO. However such is the murkiness of Kyrgyz politics it cannot be discounted that the Chinese are quietly egging Bakiyev to let the Americans stay to balance the Russians. "In general, it is possible to claim that China is not against the US presence in Kyrgyzstan as it counters Russia there," notes Erica Marat, a researcher at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.
In the long-term Beijing wants the American and Russian jets gone. China's national security doctrine seeks to construct a wall of friendly neighbours free from foreign military bases. The Chinese have to be especially careful though in exercising their influence.
Many ordinary Kyrgyz, most of whom earn a living off the land, still seethe at the loss of a few mountains and glacier when the Sino-Kyrgyz border was redrawn in 2002. "For this reason the Russians will probably keep their edge over the Chinese for quite some time," says Mr Swanstrom.
By contrast they are staunchly pro-Russian, so much so that earlier this year a politician floated the idea of following in Belarus' footsteps to form a close union with Russia, a jaw-dropping proposal for the Chinese. On the other hand, the Russians too may have a use for the Americans at Manas. They can point to Manas to justify deploying combat jets to Kant to the Chinese.
Bakiyev is meanwhile ignoring even calls from prominent parliamentarians as recently as June to close the base in favour of milking the Americans. The president jacked up the rent for Manas from $2 million dollars a year to $20 million and squeezed $130 million in aid and other inducements from Washington. Russia, a fellow member of the Cooperative Security Treaty Organisation of once Soviet republics, rents Kant for between nothing and up to $4.5 million annually.
On the face of it Bakiyev, who came to power through the Tulip Revolution in February 2005, can score points from upping the Americans' rent while adding more money to the leaky government pot to cheer his supporters, both political and criminal.
But keeping America on the ground may also help balance the looming dominance of China and Russia. If nothing else, it is another reason for the largesse to keep flowing from Beijing and Moscow. He may be forced to call on Moscow and possibly Beijing for help to win the 2010 election. "Bakiyev is extremely unpopular and corrupt domestically and the SCO summit provides him a great opportunity to reserve support from Russia and China," says Ms Marat.
That is if commotion does not strike before then. The last few years have been marred by frequent protests and clashes. Kyrgyzstan remains sharply divided, ominously pitching the north against the south. Factions criss-crossing that simplistic division and tied into clans and organized crime extending deeply into government adds a layer of complexity that is nothing if not unpredictable.
American and Europe might at least pay lip service to crime and corruption, law and governance in Kyrgyzstan. China and Russia pay little attention placing a premium on influence at any cost. "They are saying they will work with any government. That has been very important for countries like Kyrgyzstan," says Mr Swanstrom.
For the time being the odds favour continued advances by China and Russia in Central Asia, especially while American and European strategy remains in disarray. "The European Union and the United States need to regroup to draw a strategy for long-term engagement in the region. If they could move in to be an alternative that would change everything, but I don't see that coming," says Mr Swanstrom.
Nevertheless as the situation in Kyrgyzstan suggests, Central Asian politics remain volatile and unpredictable, nowhere more so than Kyrgyzstan. It would be folly to write off the Americans and Europeans, while presuming the victory of the Chinese and Russians. They have fallen out in the past. Cooperation today may yet fall victim to deep-seated rivalry.