The recent visit to Yangon of Ibrahim Gambari, UN Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs indicates a renewed effort at international diplomacy to communicate with Myanmar. Although the outcome of the meeting has not been publicised, the junta's cooperation suggests that its political intransigence is much more nuanced that previously imagined.

Although there remains no consensus on how the world should deal with Myanmar, there is broad agreement that sanctions against the country have failed to move the generals. This failure is derived from three sources. First, the global community is divided over the prospects for political change in Myanmar. Correspondingly, regional actors are in a muddle over the threat Myanmar poses to its neighbours, and finally, there is little unanimity over the effective measures required to encourage greater freedom in that country. 

While the international community wishes for Myanmarese national reconciliation, the restoration of democracy and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi - the difficulty lies in coming up with a common approach to deal with the junta. Various international governments have devised different policies to address "the Myanmar problem". Japan has stressed the importance of humanitarian intervention, whereas Australia has continued its modest indirect assistance to the regime albeit cautiously. The US on the other hand has endorsed maximum sanctions to rid the country of the military regime. In the meantime, the EU has been less missionary and emotional in its approach, and has backed multilateral efforts through the UN. 

Thailand on the other hand has been playing a different kind of game. Its previous government claimed that a close relationship with Myanmar, through the promotion of bilateral trade and investment was in the national interests of Thailand. Sanctions therefore have never been an option whilst the Thaksin government conducted its diplomacy with Myanmar.

But even if these approaches are poles apart, the aims and objectives of the governments in question have remained relatively similar. In spite of the current difficulty in fashioning a uniform and coherent Myanmar policy, the international community should first adopt a common vision to bring about change in Myanmar and deliberate uniform policy responses at the UN or a similar fora, to plot common approaches rather than break out into various courses of action.

A corollary quandary lies in the way the world perceives Myanmar. Some analysts wonder whether Myanmar is a regional security threat to its neighbours, or if this threat is exaggerated. China, India, and Thailand would probably not describe Myanmar as a security issue that causes sleepless nights. Also, it is unlikely that ASEAN would consider Myanmar to be an obstacle to regional integration, having effectively ignored it. At best, Myanmar represents a "black mark" on ASEAN's ability to resolve problems between member-state.

What appears clear is that an approach that advocates a sanctions-only regime is unlikely to host an agent of political change the world pines for. David Steinberg of the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University has alluded to the futility of a sanctions regime that is even abhorred by Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD (National League for Democracy). The NLD has openly disapproved of sanctions and attest that "some humanitarian assistance remains quintessential for the ordinary Burmese."

A new approach to deal with Myanmar is not designed to shield it from international criticism, but rather reflects the reality on the ground. In the past, sanctions were meant to suffocate the government, but on balance, they contribute to the economic misery of the common citizens. The ban on the imports from Myanmar for example was designed to cut the country off completely from the world market and to limit the foreign exchange available to ordinary citizens. It also led to significant unemployment and a spike in the number of economic migrants seeking illegal work outside the country. Worse, rather than isolating Myanmar, the sanctions worked to isolate the world from Myanmar and deprived it of influence over the country's development.

A calibrated humanitarian intervention that takes on a developmental strain may represent a plausible mechanism if employed effectively. Michael Green of Georgetown University has stated that what is required in the current environment are "smart sanctions" that encompass surgical coercion alongside dialogue, humanitarian assistance and the use of "soft power". In addition, the continuation of educational assistance must remain a fundamental tactic in promoting a mindset change among the junta. To date, Germany remains the only foreign government that offers scholarships to Myanmar's government officials. More states should consider similar vistas as agents of progressive change.

Finally, an audacious suggestion to overwhelm Myanmar with more trade and investment may well sow the seeds for greater democratisation. Although the junta will obviously benefit from such policies, the spin-offs may open doors to other potentialities such as an influx of tourists, greater international attention and the coalescing of the intellectual capital required to resolve "the Myanmar problem".