By all accounts, the debate that flared up following off-the-cuff comments made by Singapore's Minister Mentor Mr Lee Kuan Yew on 15 September during a dialogue on good governance, will continue long after ruffled diplomatic feathers have settled.

Opinion pieces continue to be generated and forums continue to be held, all to discuss matters emanating from the issue of "marginalisation". Indeed, the issue holds the promise of reversing the regional trend towards diminishing public space.

The initial reactions were boringly predictable. Barisan Nasional leaders in Malaysia refused to admit that Mr Lee's comments were correct in any way, called it "naughty", and suggested that ulterior motives were involved. Some opposition leaders and activist groups took the contrary view and generally stated that the comments were highlighting the obvious.

Interestingly, the debate and the protests have revolved around the question of whether the Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia were marginalised or not, and as an extension of that, to what extent various other groups, if not all groups, felt marginalised. However, the transcript of Mr Lee's comments, released as part of his apology to Malaysian Premier Abdullah Badawi on 2 October, contained much more that is worthy of discussion than the intuitively understood and therefore necessarily controversial term, "marginalisation".

There is in fact a three-pronged reasoning apparent in Mr Lee's comments that explains the subsequent angry reactions from Singapore's neighbours, in particular, Malaysia.

The first element was the claim that the Chinese in Malaysia and Indonesia were "marginalised". Sadly, it was this point that secured most airtime and column inches, thereby overshadowing the significance of the other two.

The second element concerns the suggestion of systematic marginalisation. Since national collectives always require for its stability the proselytising of a central discourse that provides the basic rationale and the popular moralisations for government policies and their implementation at all levels, the groups disadvantaged by this discourse will in truth be "systematically" marginalised.

What is essential for understanding a nation at any point in time then is the charting of this discursive adhesive. This is because general policy-making has to explain itself to the public through that net of simple reasoning. What sort of society this central discourse creates in the long run, and how it is able to rectify its detrimental effects, are the criteria for its success.

The third element of this analysis is that since a nation's foreign policy must stem from its central discourse, the effects of this central discourse go beyond the boundaries of any nation. Thus, the purported systematic marginalisation of Chinese Malaysians (and many Malaysians of other races as well, for that matter) generated by a prolonged and poorly understood New Economic Policy, when extended into the sphere of foreign affairs, encourages the attitude that a neighbouring country such as Singapore, with its Chinese majority, should be "compliant".

This notion that a central discourse, which I have referred to as "sufficient discursive commonality" elsewhere,­ is needed in forming a functioning national entity, and in defining its relationship with the rest of the world, contains distinct advantages for the study of international relations.

One country's central discourse generates foreign policies that must sooner or later meet those generated by another country's central discourse. One national worldview must relate to another national worldview, and peace or war results depending on how the two trains of thought happen to reject or accept each other's rationale and moralisations.

The central discourse in Singapore, partly by virtue of its history, was consciously constructed to oppose certain central aspects of the Malaysian one. It strongly acknowledges the consequences of the Malaysian discourse that it most feared. And so, it proclaims the virtue of meritocracy, the need "to stay ahead" and "to move forward", attempts to adopt the latest innovations in emergent fields, and at the same time, it avoids overt welfare policies and affirmative action. In foreign policy, this translates into arguments for a strong defence force and a fast growing and adaptive internationally dependent economy.

Consequently, the symbiotic relationship between the discourses in domestic and foreign policies in the case of Singapore, leads to Mr Lee's conclusion that the country needs "a government who'll be able to, not only have the gumption, but the skill to say "No" in a very quiet, polite way that doesn't provoke (Malaysia and Indonesia) into doing something silly." 

The understanding of politics herewith prescribed strongly suggests that the improving of relations between nations requires more than the mere reforming of foreign policies. For relations between Malaysia and Singapore to improve significantly, more profound changes than a mere change of leaders ought to take place, and these must involve the transformation of central themes and concepts in the central discourses of both countries.