To the Burmese, their country appears to be one with a terminal illness.  At best, it could be nursed in an Intensive Care Unit. Atworst however will die a slow, un-medicated death.  If Nirvana is the ultimate spiritual goal of all Burmese, then post-conflict reconstruction is the preferred mission of all pro-change Burmese citizens.

The population of Burma is cursed by rich natural resources and ageographical location strategically important to Asia's emergingglobal powers such as China and India.  The Burmese suffer not only material destitution and poor leadership, but also intellectualimpoverishment and institutional failures. Will there ever be a post-conflict phase for this beleaguered nation of 50 million multi-ethnic peoples?

The short answer to this question is No. Here is why:

Burma's 60-plus years of conflict have exacted an incalculable cost tosociety in terms of economic productivity, social cohesion, human resource development, natural resource availability, national political integration and various  other dimensions of humandevelopment. One will never know the exact number of people killed ormaimed, or of lives destroyed in Burma. The estimates would most probably be no less than a few million - similar number of victimswere killed under the genocidal Pol Pot regime.

Unfortunately, the wave of post-independence conflicts shows no sign of de-escalation.   The most important stakeholder in these conflicts– the country's Armed Forces –appears only interested in escalating its war against 'internal and external destructive elements'; the official term for organised opposition groups.  These include Aung San Suu Kyi's political party, ethnic armed resistance organisations, andpro-change Western governments.

While the traditional notion of "National Security" is being broadened elsewhere to encompass the societal impact of climate change, foodinsecurity, and other crises of mass scale, the Burmese generals have equated 'National Security' with 'Regime Security'.  The State is a categorical failure in everything except in its ability to maintain territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Lacking internallegitimacy internal stability is maintained only at gunpoint. Yet the regime authority is challenged by various sectors of the society.  TheSaffron Revolution by the Buddhist clergy last autumn was the latest in a long series of civil conflicts that have engulfed the militarised State since the coup of 1962.

No individual dictator, civilian or military, can survive without an institutional base.  Burma has witnessed a succession of military
strongmen, and the armed forces (or Tatmadaw) play this most crucial institutional role. The Tatmadaw is the saviour of the generals under siege, as opposed to the saviour of the nation.

This creates an intra-military symbiosis between the generals and therank and file officers, which enables all ranks to meddle freely in civil domains for which they are ill-equipped - agriculture, foreign relations, national economic affairs, civilian education, tourism and so on. As a result, the bureaucracy is increasingly militarised. The legislative and judicial processes are either wholly in the hands of the military officers or allowed to exist only nominally. Economic policies are designed to sustain the survival of the top leadership and its institutional base.

The junta ostensibly pursues 'national unity' while in practice it resorts to classic 'divide and rule' tactic, both within the Armed Forces and society at large. In addition, the arbitrary use by the top leadership of violence and coercion – often justified in the name of 'national security' – is a defining characteristic of the system. Since 2003, the generals have revived the old local political practiceof inciting political violence against the opposition by unleashing the thuggish elements from the Union Solidarity and Development Organisation (USDA) on the opposition. They attack any dissenters as the police and other law enforcement agencies simply look on. But force alone is not a sufficient condition to maintain this deeply militarised polity.

Historical memories and local culture are selectively manipulated in order to foster favourable attitudes towards the generals and the Armed Forces. While disregarding the role of Buddhist-Hindu codes of kingly conduct, the regime's propaganda evokes the imagery of Burma's ancient warrior kings in order to construct historical continuity. The role of the modern Burmese army in the liberation struggle against British colonial rule has been exaggerated, whilst nationalist contributions by other groups such as Burmese communists, ethnic minority communities, intelligentsia, workers and peasantry are marginalised or completely erased. Furthermore, a siege mentality and the concept of oneself or one's group as the victim pervades in both the military and its backers in various ethnic communities, and the rest of the society.

The efficacy of a half-century of consistent propaganda cannot be overestimated. Both the generals and the rank and file are convinced of their morally superior role as the 'saviour of the nation', a nation which in their view will balkanise without the strong hand of the military.

The current Constitution, adopted in the widely denounced referendum held in the wake of the Cyclone Nargis, simply legalises the special role of the armed forces (and military officers). It elevates the military above all other institutions in society. However, as "no man is an island unto himself," no dictatorship in a global economy survives on its domestic design alone.

Burma's successive military strong men, from the late General Ne Win to the current ageing despot Senior General Than Shwe, have carefully built ties and support networks within the international order. The country's rich endowment in natural resources such as natural gas and oil, fertile soil, teak, gems and minerals, as well as its strategically important geography, have afforded the generals great opportunities to lure important foreign powers into its allegiance.

During the Cold War, generals led by the ruthless Ne Win were able to extract concessions and support from Western governments, including full recognition, financial support, military training and intelligence cooperation. Post-Cold War, the West has become a little embarrassed about its ties with the Burmese military. Nevertheless the generals have found new friends in old enemies such as China, Thailand, and India. Sitting on vast natural gas deposits, and serving as a strategic and commercial linchpin for China, India and Southeast Asia, the generals have outfoxed their old Western friends.

The international extractive industry, from both the West and the rest, keeps the Burmese regime financially solvent, providing areliable income stream. And while the United Nations and Association of Southeast Asian Nations request over US$200 million for cyclone relief and farm recovery, the generals gleefully sit on US$ 2-3 billion from gas and oil sales; a veritable war chest by localstandards. Unfortunately, neither the United States nor the European Union are prepared to forego the interests of their energy firms as represented by USA's Chevron and France's Total; energy security takes priority over human security.

Of all the players, the junta has all the powers to de-escalate this long-running conflict. But it won't.  Burma's conflicts give the military the greatest institutional rationale for the continuation of its absolute control, domination and primacy over the rest of thesociety.  Why kill the Golden Goose that lays your eggs?

This half-century of military rule should dispel any illusions about the possibilities of post-conflict reconstruction.

The regime has made it unequivocally clear to the world where its priorities lie. Not even Cyclone Nargis and the ensuing devastation
could ruin the generals' plan to legalise their political control and domination; they pressed ahead with their sham Constitutional Referendum in the midst of Burma's national tragedy.

Unlike say, apartheid South Africa, there is no elite minority with financial ties to the West in Burma. Nor does the country have strategic value for Western powers. At this point, neither the United Nations nor the West holds any bargaining chip to raise the cost of the generals' behaviour.  As long as the international extractive industry and non-Western global powers favour the authoritarian status quo, the international community has little incentive or capability to push for the democratic alternative.

That is bad news for the Burmese people who must live with a regime that is not only repressive but also callous enough to block any effective delivery of relief support to 3 million Cyclone victims, 30-40 percent of whom are innocent children.