Changes in the post-Cold War global strategic order are leading to a faster pace of nuclear proliferation in some key regions of the world. The Middle East is one such region and Northeast Asia is another.

In Northeast Asia, Japan remains the only non-nuclear great power. But Japan may become less willing to rely on America for its nuclear security —because Japan is feeling less secure than it did during the Cold War.

Thus an emerging nuclear balance in Northeast Asia now exists. Moreover, tensions generated in the China-Japan-Korea core region have repercussions further south, where the Australia-Indonesia nexus is a sub-region of security. The consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia could be that both Indonesia and Australia decide  they need nuclear weapons for their security.

In Northeast Asia, the main “drivers” of strategic change are the steady pace of China’s force modernisation and North Korea’s nuclear and missile brinkmanship. China’s development of nuclear weapons reflected the circumstances of the Cold War — the imperative to deter both nuclear-armed superpowers. The resolution of the Cold War left China free to apply its nuclear weapons to other interests. India’s acquisition of a nuclear deterrent was mainly a response to China’s becoming a nuclear weapons power. In turn, India’s proliferation has its own consequences.

So China’s greater strategic latitude is setting up a fresh set of dynamics in which states most affected may respond to China’s possession of nuclear weapons by developing their own weapons as a counter to China, and for other purposes as well. To this heady mix is added North Korea, which has acquired nuclear weapons to compensate for its acute weakness and vulnerability.

Since the end of the Cold War, the North Korean threat to Japan has been growing steadily, but the United States lacks credible means of bringing military pressure to bear on Pyongyang. In these circumstances, North Korea is giving Japan reason to acquire offensive capabilities. Those capabilities could be used against China, without Japan’s needing to say so. Critically, how long would such offensive capabilities remain non-nuclear?

Japan might think conventional offensive capabilities would suffice to deter North Korea. But it would probably not be long before Japan came to think that the only answer to Chinese and North Korean nuclear weapons was a Japanese nuclear weapon.

America is seeking to convince Japan that it remains a reliable ally and it hopes that extended deterrence (the “nuclear umbrella”) plus missile defence will be enough to convince Japan that it can still depend on the United States. But will this be enough to reassure Japan?

And will the US be willing to do as much as it did in the past to assure Japan’s strategic protection, when the US relationship with China is so different from America’s previous relationship with the USSR? Does the US alliance suit Japan’s interests as well as it used to, given changed strategic circumstances? We do not know the answers to these questions. But they are likely to manifest themselves sooner rather than later if North Korea continues its brinkmanship, as presumably it will.

So what are the potential knock on effects elsewhere of the emerging nuclear balance in Northeast Asia — especially in the Australia-Indonesia security subset?

Australia, including for reasons of distance, can afford to rely more than Japan does on extended deterrence in relation to both China and North Korea. But it may not elect to do so if in future Indonesia decided it required its own deterrent.

The steady pace of China’s force modernisation, especially its growing maritime and missile capabilities, will have an impact on Indonesia as well as India. Probably, if Indonesia decided it needed nuclear weapons, it would be responding to events unrelated to Australia. But any Indonesian action in this regard would influence Australia. Australia would have to take account of Indonesian capabilities, not just current perceived intentions.

It does not follow automatically that Indonesia’s acquisition of a nuclear deterrent would require Australia to a pursue nuclear capability of its own. Australia might well prefer to continue to rely on extended US deterrence. Still, Australia needs to hedge. At a minimum, it needs to prevent its option to enrich uranium from being permanently closed off.

Thus for security as well as economic reasons, Australia is successfully resisting aspects of President Bush’s Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) that would see Australia required to permanently to give up the enrichment option. Announced in February 2006, the GNEP focuses on the fear that terrorists will acquire fissile material. Thus the US aims to close off enrichment options for countries that do not currently have fully functioning facilities for their nuclear power plants. Countries with existing enrichment facilities would guarantee security of supply to those countries that either lack the option to enrich uranium, or choose not to do so.

But Australia, which has 38% of the world’s known low-cost uranium reserves, will not remain content to be among the “have nots”. And even though Australia currently exports only uranium oxide (yellowcake) and has no nuclear power plants, times are changing rapidly as the global nuclear power industry enjoys a revival.

The Australian prime minister, John Howard, can use the issue of climate change to divide his domestic opponents. Nuclear energy would become far more economic if the price of coal were raised, for example, by the use of “clean coal” technology necessary to reduce carbon emissions believed to be the main cause of global warming.

Howard is also exposing the absurdities of the anti-nuclear stance of the opposition Labor Party, demonstrating that his government has the employment interests of workers at heart. Moreover, Howard is showing that he is willing to stand up to America on an issue of national interest.

Responding to Australian concerns, the Bush administration became willing to contemplate a special status for Australia (and Canada) in the GNEP. Mr Dennis Spurgeon, US Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, said in August that “special rules” would apply to Australia and Canada. The reason for this exception, he said, was that the two countries had the bulk of global economically recoverable uranium resources.

That concession did not sit well with some proliferation experts in the United States. They worry that exceptions to the GNEP would encourage enrichment ambitions on the part of Brazil, Argentina and South Africa. Australia fully shares US fears of the consequences of Islamic terrorists acquiring fissile material. But even the closest of allies do not always see things the same way.

That may be especially so when it comes to nuclear weapons because they represent survival interests. Thus Australia will continue to keep its uranium enrichment options open, not least because it lives in an unpredictable region where a new nuclear power balance is emerging.