Thai military budget set to rise. Again.

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Pavin Chachavalpongpun
28 Aug 2007
Chachavalpongpun

In Thailand, politics is the battlefield where the military has long fought many battles - and won. Last September’s coup was another exercise that drove home the point - any illusion of the armed forces owing subservience to a civilian government has never really acquired currency in a country where the military has established itself in national politics ever since the abolishment of absolute monarchy some 75 years ago.

Throughout this period, the Thai military has assigned itself the role of safeguarding the main pillars of Thai nationhood — sovereignty and monarchy. As an indispensable feature of Thai political discourse, the military has shown no desire of abdicating its role as a legitimate player in the political landscape.

The recent revelation of the defence budget for 2008 continues this tradition, but also amplifies the military’s desire to retain and even expand its influence into the political realm. The new monetary allocation is controversial because, out of a 1.66 trillion baht ($48.5 billion) budget, the Defence Ministry received the biggest boost, with an increase over the previous year to 140 billion baht, representing 8.6 percent of the total budget.

The Defence Ministry is set to host a 24.3 percent rise in defence spending for the fiscal year starting October 1. Year on year, this represents another hefty increase, after a 33.8 percent rise a year earlier. Despite the spike in defence spending, the Budget Bill has provided scarce details governing the military’s requirement for more money.

A possible explanation points to the ongoing insurgency in restive Muslim-majority southern provinces. Since the violence began in January 2004, more than 2,300 people have been killed in what is perceived in Bangkok as an irredentist campaign.

Presumably, a larger slice of the budget will be spent on upgrading the Thai armed forces to meet immediate treats to national security. But military analysts are sceptical about the real intention behind the increased defence spending, with significant segments of opinion suggesting that a higher portion of the budget should be allocated for the economic upliftment of rural and grassroot communities hit by the current economic slowdown.

The military has based its case for a higher budget on the neglect exhibited by deposed premier Thaksin Shinawatra during his five years in power, focussing on the ill-apportioned national resources that were used to promote his populist projects. In fairness, Thaksin’s self-serving politics badly affected the transition of a Thai military that was struggling to complete a process of adjustment for a post-Cold War role, having served as a frontline against the advance of communism in the region for over 40 years. Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont, a former army chief, said, “In the past, the military only had a budget to spend on administration, but it had nothing new in terms of technology or training. We have stopped like we have been unplugged.”

However, over the last three decades, the modernisation of the Thai military has been characterised by haphazardness. Defence budgets varied according to the regime of the day. It was therefore expected that whenever a military government took hold of political power, defence expenditure tended to rise perceptibly, albeit less than the amount disbursed towards education and healthcare.

Even at the height of political authoritarianism in Thailand in the 1970s, Thai military spending was noticeably less than its neighbouring countries, as the national budget was dedicated for the development of infrastructure to accelerate Thailand’s entry into the league of rapidly developing nations. Then came the 1997 financial crisis, which witnessed Thailand’s defence budget slashed by about 25 percent. Subsequent increases in the military budget since 1997 have only represented adjustments for inflation.

Now that the military is back in control of the purse strings, the ratcheting up of the defence budget is not unsurprising. But with 75 years of experience and the military’s undiminished role in politics as a point of reference, analysts are already wondering how the money will be spent. In the previous budget hikes, a large portion of budget was spent on salaries. A Thai military analyst cautioned that this year’s increase in the budget could once more end up in the pockets of the army’s top brass, rather than in the investment of new equipment or training. It is this very mismanagement that has long tainted the professionalism of the military and its ability to set long lasting priorities.

As a result, the military capability of the Thai armed forces has somewhat stagnated and morale of troops is low. The same troops are well known to lack discipline mainly owing to the lack of investment in training, be it on the training ground or in the classroom. Organisational reforms have met with little progress. Plan to downsize force numbers have landed on deaf ears and calls to eradicate corruption are seen to be playing up to the gallery. In the meantime, the military continues to be preoccupied with asserting its influence in national politics.

There is a clarion interest in how the military intends to spend its budget for the current fiscal year. Failure to imbibe a sense of accountability could further damage the military’s reputation. Since the military overthrew the Thaksin regime last year, it managed to expand its list of enemies that are rallying around its undemocratic rule. Already, anti-coup activists have gnawed at the newly drafted constitution, which was widely perceived as being in favour of the army, since it grants the right of future requests for a larger allocation of the budget to the military.

It is an open secret that the Thai military has long been yearning to maintain its footprint in politics. But the controversy that is swirling around the recent increase in defence spending threatens to turn even more ferocious if the military intends to use it as a means to cling on to power, particularly in the period leading up to the general election in December.


Pavin Chachavalpongpun is a Visiting Research Fellow at the ASEAN Studies Centre, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore.

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