A law that allows Japan to use space for military purposes passed Japan’s parliament on 21 May.  This is good news because it means that Japan has taken an important step to strengthen its co-operation with the United States in missile defence. Yet Japan is still confronted by hard choices in its strategic policy.

Japan, living in a dangerous neighbourhood, will look after its nuclear security one way or another.  It is vastly preferable for regional stability that Japan continue to do so under the umbrella of the US alliance rather than opt to go it alone.  That choice would almost certainly lead to Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The new law was sponsored by both the ruling coalition and the largest opposition party.  It will allow Japan to use its satellite network and other assets for military surveillance and early warning as part of the ballistic missile defence system being built with the United States.

Ostensibly, the program is directed against North Korea, which test-fired a missile over Japan’s main island in 1998 and tested a nuclear weapon in 2006.  But Japan is also worried about the military threat implied in China’s space program.  China’s growing capabilities were demonstrated when it destroyed one of its own satellites with a missile in January 2007.

The new law will allow Japan to establish a space task force under the prime minister, as well as a new minister of space development.  According to the bill, space programs should contribute to the “peace and safety of international society, as well as the national security of our country”.  Thus the new law will explicitly do away with a 1969 law that limited space programs to peaceful purposes.

Still, seamless connectivity between Japan and the United States in missile defence remains a long way off.  That’s because Japan remains ambivalent about missile defence.  The Japanese want protection against Chinese and North Korean missiles, and know that they lack the resources, both technical and financial, to go it alone.  Thus they understand that any effective antiballistic missile capability depends on interoperability with US forces.

Yet Japan is wary of being just a node in a US global missile defence system.  America’s enemies would then become Japan’s enemies as well.  The pre-emptive “Bush Doctrine” has naturally increased Japan’s fears of entanglement.  Moreover, current talk of US military attacks on Iran will heighten Japanese concerns.  So Japan wants to ensure that it has control of its own assets.

So Japan is now confronted with the kind of hard choices that it was able to avoid during the Cold War.  During the early stages of the Cold War, Japan was a vital base in a US strategy that sought to counter Soviet claims of hegemony over Eurasia by reminding Moscow that war in the west would also mean war in the east.  Thus Japan had immense leverage in the alliance, and was able to deflect nearly all US requests that it should do more, while still being able to count on automatic US support.

But America’s alignment with China in the latter days of the Cold War, and the fall of the USSR, started to erode the glue binding the US and Japan together.  Moreover, China, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, was moving into the global economy and becoming a very different China.  It is now part competitor with the US, and part collaborator.  Thus it became increasingly apparent that Japan cannot now expect automatic support from the US.

That was not good news for a Japan troubled throughout the 1990s by a lagging economy and growing sense of international isolation.  North Korea also became a particular worry, with its dangerous nuclear and missile brinkmanship.

Thus Japan has taken steps towards greater involvement in US defence, ranging as far as the Middle East.  These steps include refueling of US navy ships in the Indian Ocean, and some non combat troops sent to Iraq in 2004.  Currently, Japan’s Air Self Defence force is undertaking considerable risk in helping air lift supplies to Iraq.

Moreover, Japan’s new law on space meets US requirements for co-operation in missile defence.  That may not guarantee Japan immunity from Chinese or even North Korean missiles.  But it will help greatly in the defence of Japan and of US forces stationed there.  
The US is making considerable efforts to address Japan’s concerns about missile defence in the new joint US-Japan command centre being set up at Yokota Air Force base near Tokyo.  There will be various opportunities for interaction, such as satellites, where the two countries could join forces in development, funding and information sharing, if that is really Japan’s intent.

Thus the “architecture” of missile defence will continue to define the US-Japan alliance.  While many uncertainties remain, Japan’s new space law is a positive sign for regional security.