It is high time India rethinks its ties with Myanmar. For a decade, New Delhi has been eagerly courting the junta, turning from critic to supporter, encouraging Indian firms to invest while supplying weapons on easy terms. In return, it has precious little to show.

Rebels in northeastern India still find sanctuary and supplies across the border in Myanmar. New Delhi's pleading over the years for serious cooperation to put the rebels to flight seemingly elicits understanding but no determined action from the generals. This suggests that hopes discussions between General Thura Shwe Mann, Myanmar's chief of staff, and India's Eastern Command early in December about "joint exercises" will lead to a knockout blow against the rebels are misplaced.

When the long hoped for offensive fails to materialize there is little India can do to force Myanmar into action. Naypyidaw, where the government now resides in a trophy capital, simply has no pressing reason to comply with New Delhi's wishes.

It is certainly not dependent upon India for advanced weapons, though offers from New Delhi are of course welcomed, most recently when Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi, commander of the Indian Air Force, visited Senior General Than Shwe, head of the military junta, in Naypyidaw on 22 November. Equally good kit is coming from Israel, Russia, Singapore and Ukraine.

But then is the situation in the northeast so serious and intractable that India, a country rich in thought and intelligence, has no choice but to seek an iron-clad helping hand from the inscrutable and frankly bizarre regime in Naypyidaw? India can do better: a new strategy that seeks common ground in the northeast, with international mediation if need be. Indonesia's Aceh found peace through negotiation. Norway came within a whisker of a settling the bitter feud between Sinhalese and Tamils.

Crushing the northeast rebellions is simply a pretext, a thin one at that, for New Delhi to find common cause with the generals, who have been also battling insurgents for decades in Myanmar's contested border districts. In currying Naypyidaw's favour New Delhi eyes a prize greater than victory in the northeast: fuel for India's booming economy, which is rich in labour and brains but poor in energy.

Hard-up Myanmar, with only one-twentieth of the population of India and a tiny economy, is eager to sell energy. Its proven gas reserves are about a third of those found in India, while proven oil reserves are about double those of Thailand. Oil and gas reserves could grow as exploration is continuing, on and offshore, with Chinese firms in the vanguard.

New Delhi's budding friendship with the generals has doubtless helped Indian companies join a Korean-led consortium assembling platforms and manning wells to pump gas from Block A1 under the Andaman Sea. But alas has come up short when it comes to buying gas.

In January 2006 Ajay Tyagi, a senior Indian bureaucrat, reportedly visited Yangon hoping to strike a deal for Block A1 gas. Only then was he told the gas, about a tenth of estimated reserves, had been earmarked for China through an understanding reached with Beijing-controlled PetroChina in late 2005.

That rebuke is a clear indication that India is just another customer. India will surely get some oil and gas from Myanmar, but then so will South Korea, Thailand and others. But first refusal, and probably the larger slice, will doubtless go to China.

For all the realpolitick, warm words and weapons, India's influence clearly still runs a poor second to China's in Myanmar. It is a competition that India is unlikely to win. China's interests, in trade and security, ports and resources, will ensure that whatever India does to woo the generals, China will top.

While some in the junta bridle at China's great influence it is at least a reliable partner. India's policy is ultimately at risk of reversal when people head to the ballot boxes. Moreover India is now shedding its once celebrated non-aligned status to align with the community of liberal democracies that value human rights and justice. Even more unnerving for the junta, India has entered a nuclear technology pact with America.

Washington has been pressuring the UN of late to take a harder stand with the generals over democracy and human rights, pushing for tougher resolutions and perhaps later ultimatums. India, even if it wanted, would be hard pushed to oppose or even water these down.

For Myanmar, like other authoritarian states, China, which can wield rather more power and influence as a permanent member of the Security Council, is a better wagon to band with. China, not India, then will moderate resolutions pushed by America and backed by Europe and Japan.

Not only has this policy delivered little materially or strategically but it has come at high cost to India's reputation. It sits uncomfortably with India's democracy, values and heritage that have been a source of inspiration and hope for many. Mahatma Gandhi's principles of non-violence have been a great inspiration for Myanmar's opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

Weapons and indulgence has provided a poor return. India is not receiving preference or cooperation it seeks from Myanmar. New Delhi should then cease supplying weapons and jockeying with China, instead solely focusing on energy and trade. For they are the very spheres where India can make real gains while offering a large market Myanmar needs to limit its dependence on China.