As the old order withers and the fulcrum of global politics shifts towards Asia, India has to decide whether it wants to be co-opted into the existing West-dominated international structures or strike an independent path.

No country will “help” India become a major world power. In the ongoing tussles in the UN, the WTO, and the IMF, India is ranged against the present-day ‘haves.’ India can become more powerful in a new balance of power only at the expense of existing powers.

As India’s ambitions pose a long-term challenge to the existing global order, it will meet resistance. India’s right to build and retain its strategic autonomy is at the heart of the ongoing debate in India over the India-US nuclear deal. India cannot do this on its own.

The US realises that only India, China and Russia can collectively pose a credible challenge to its global domination. It would therefore like to see these three countries kept divided and, where possible, co-opted. Therein lies India’s importance as a ‘swing’ state.

While better relations with the US do serve India’s interests, there are limits to an India-US partnership, since their long-term strategic interests diverge on many issues such as India’s conduct of an independent foreign policy, issues like Pakistan, the Gulf region, and the ‘war on terror’.

Any Indo-US true strategic relationship will entail costs for India, especially in its relations with China. While diversifying its foreign policy options, India must not undermine traditional friendships and nascent encouraging partnerships with other players.

India cannot become a great power unless it takes along its neighbours. Its self-interest requires a fresh thinking in its neighbourhood policy. If India is to be recognised as the leader of South Asia, it has to earn its neighbours’ respect and admiration by handling them with care and sensitivity, and by synergising the considerable convergence of interests and meeting of minds at the popular level. It cannot hope to remain prosperous if its neighbours continue to languish, as growing economic opportunities in India will inevitably generate cross-border illegal flows of migrants.

Nor can India remain insulated from the social and political turbulences in its neighbourhood. India must therefore stimulate the economic development of its neighbours through unilateral trade and economic concessions whose non-economic gains would outweigh possible economic sacrifices.

India should strive for maximum possible integration with its neighbouring countries so that relations are insulated from political predilections of the ruling regimes and possible machinations of outside powers. India also needs to firmly and unambiguously convey to its neighbours that it has legitimate security and other concerns it expects them to respect, that it will be uncompromising in protecting its core interests, and that its neighbours cannot tweak its nose with impunity. For the sake of its internal security, India cannot remain detached from the dynamics of internal politics of India’s neighbours, as these tend to have a spillover effect on India.

Relations with China will have elements of both a cooperative partnership, as well as strategic competition. Although overall bilateral relations have developed rapidly over the last few years, border negotiations have stalled, and the latent mistrust of China among the Indian public has resurfaced. While keeping China engaged, and exercising vigilance on the border, India should show firmness, confidence and above all patience in border negotiations.

Although it does not suit China at present to create unnecessary tension on the border, China is unlikely to settle the boundary question with India unless it has definitively resolved the question of Tibet on its terms and Tibet comes firmly under its control. India should not have a relationship of perpetual conflict with China and must seek possible areas of cooperation, but without any illusions. Greater economic ties, including across the border, will create greater mutual confidence and stakes in a stable, peaceful relationship.

Traditionally China has never regarded India as an equal, and has used Pakistan (and India’s other neighbours) to keep India in check. An India at odds with its neighbours and unsure about China’s long-term intentions will not be able to divert resources from defence to economic priorities and to challenge China’s dominance in Asia. China’s strategic encirclement of India requires an Indian counter-strategy and a focused, activist policy towards China.

Relations with ASEAN and East Asia constitute an increasingly important dimension of India’s foreign policy priorities. India’s ‘Look East’ policy has strong economic imperatives and long-term strategic ramifications. There is also an important domestic dimension in that the neglected Northeast India could become the fulcrum of a thriving and integrated economic space linking India and Southeast Asia.

The East Asia Summit (EAS) has bridged the psychological, political and strategic gap between India and East Asia. The existing or proposed free trade and comprehensive economic cooperation agreements in Asia could evolve into a regional architecture around the EAS that would, by taking advantage of existing complementarities, create stronger synergies and lead to optimal benefits for all participants. This would make the 21st century a truly “Asian” one, with India playing a central role.

West Asia and the Gulf region have a deep impact on India’s security and other vital interests. This region is a major source of oil imports, provides jobs for millions of migrant Indian workers, and is an attractive source of large-scale investments. India has enormous stakes separately with the Arab world, Israel and Iran and must manage their mutual contradictions and hostilities. It has to take a strategic perspective on this region, and play a more active role in ensuring that it remains peaceful and stable. Enjoying good relations with all the principal players in this region, India could play a role in trying to develop a regional security structure like the ARF that brings together all the key players from within and outside the region.

Russia remains India’s trusted friend and has given India valuable political, diplomatic and strategic support on vital issues affecting India’s national interests. Today, both Russia and India see mutual gain in strengthening a partnership that has survived turbulent times. There is reciprocal support and understanding for each other’s strategic interests, and complementarities in important fields like oil and gas, defence, nuclear, space, and science and technology. However, trade and economic cooperation must increase and diversify in order to give India-Russia relations a sound foundation and long-term stability.

India’s interests in Central Asia are fundamentally strategic, and to some extent economic. In the unfolding new ‘Great Game’ in Central Asia centred on energy, India too has to be a player in order to protect its vital national interests. India needs to make significant oil and gas investments in Eurasia, and work for Eurasian oil and gas pipelines and power transmission lines from Central Asia to India. This could potentially transform Central Asia into a stable strategic space that unites the major powers in a web of interdependence.

India cannot ignore the developing world, which expects India to play a leadership role. India’s pursuit of its strategic political and economic objectives (such as Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council, energy security and new opportunities for exports and investments) requires the support and goodwill of developing countries. India also needs a more generous and expanded foreign aid programme.

In order to realise its potential, India needs to skilfully leverage its assets and overcome its weaknesses. It must have self-confidence, follow clear-headed policies and build the required institutional structures to sustain its foreign policy ambitions. Will India manage to rise to the challenge?