In Thailand with the PAD: "New Politics" or New Communists?

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Pavin Chachavalpongpun
29 Sep 2008
Chachavalpongpun

Somchai Wongsawat, Thailand’s 26th prime minister, assumed the top position last week amidst Thailand’s unresolved political crisis. Unfortunately however, the appointment of Somchai guarantees the continuity of massive protests staged by the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), who have accused the new premier of being another agent of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was overthrown by a military coup in September 2006.

Somchai who also happens to be Thaksin’s brother-in-law, faces an uphill task, especially in his reconciliation efforts with anti-government forces. The critical litmus test for Somchai would be to prove that he is not a Thaksin surrogate. Since the ultimate objective of the PAD had been to wipe out Thaksin’s political legacy and influence, Somchai will have to ensure that violent confrontation between the PAD and pro-government supporters will not erupt again, a rather tall ask, given the circumstances.

A great deal of attention has so far been paid to the role of the ruling People’s Power Party (PPP) and how Thaksin retained a firm political hand even while in exile in the UK from September 2006. Yet, little is known about the position of the PAD, its political dogma and the real reasons behind its persistent opposition against Thaksin and the PPP’s regime.

Calling itself a champion of democracy, the PAD has shunned democracy in dealing with past and present governments under the PPP. Its ransacking of the state-run television station in late August and the occupation of Government House thereafter illustrated nothing but brutish strong arm tactics often mimicked in failed states. Many have already condemned the PAD and regard it as a destabilising force, aimed at turning the country’s democratic system into an authoritarian political beast.

The irony of the day is that the PAD has defined itself to become the latest threat to Thai democracy. To some, it is on par with Thailand’s past number-one enemy of yesteryear —the communists. There are many valid considerations for such a comparison.The first communist movement in Thailand took root in the 1920s when a political transition in Peking was in progress. It was led by ethnic Chinese residing in Thailand. Today, the PAD is also being led by a new breed of Sino-Thai individuals, specifically, Sondhi Limthongkul. Sondhi is a media tycoon and a one-time close ally of Thaksin. The falling out between both of them has overflowed into Thai politics, a state of affairs that has much to do with revenge and struggle for power.

Communism as an alternative political ideology thrived in Thailand in the 1970s. Confused for a new Western-styled democratic system following the abolition of the absolute monarchy in 1932, Thailand was politically vulnerable and almost fell prey to communism just as many Indochinese states were succumbing to it. Thailand was left struggling against the communist threat, both internally and externally, and eventually emerged somewhat unscathed, exhibiting clear traits of a mature democracy, particularly after the end of the Cold War.

Almost two decades later, a similarly confusing ideology seems to have occupied Thailand’s political space with the PAD coming into sight as the new political force. The Thai communist movement, later to be known as the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), based on its wider appeal from influential groups in society, such as intellectuals in Bangkok, union workers, and university students. The latter formed the largest proportion of the Communist movement, transforming themselves from idealistic supporters into insurgents, a transformation that resulted in the October 1976 massacre at Thammasat University.

Coincidentally, the PAD also enjoys widespread support from the Bangkok elite, well-educated urbanites, businesses and factions in the military. The establishment of the PAD ostensibly took place in  2005 as part of an anti-Thaksin campaign, which eventually led to a military coup in September 2006. But the power of the PAD became more tangible and pronounced since Thaksin’s return to Bangkok in February 2008, five months after the coup.

The single motivation of the communists from days gone by and the PAD is almost identical — to bring down the government and legitimise “minority rule”. As much as the communists claimed to wage their war against the Thai state on behalf of the rural peasants in various parts of Thailand so they could seize political power, the PAD maintains that its mission is to protect democracy even if in reality, they continue to protect their own power interests.

Evidence of this is overwhelming in the PAD’s version of democracy, called “new politics.” The concept states that a 30% of a future parliament would consist of elected leaders while the remaining 70% would be appointed. The PAD reckons that with this new political model, future politicians would be able to exercise their powers responsibly with clear limits — an obvious anti-Thaksin measure.

Thailand seems to have arrived at a political deadlock. When Thaksin and his Thai Rak Thai Party reigned in Thailand, democracy was abused to a point where major institutional mechanisms and processes ceased to function. The PPP continued this authoritarian spirit when Samak was prime minister for 7 months. The brief experience of military rule post-Thaksin also worsened Thailand’s democratic development. Certain factions in the military have even raised the prospects of another coup. Now with the PAD’s “new politics” making its rounds, Thai democracy is at risk of becoming totally moribund. 


Pavin Chachavalpongpun is a Visiting Research Fellow at the ASEAN Studies Centre, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore.

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