The final months of 2006 witnessed two significant naval developments that are likely to shape the future of the Southeast Asian maritime security environment.

First, Hu Jintao, Chinese President and Commander-in-Chief, called on the PLA to build a powerful navy capable of confronting a spectrum of maritime threats and to safeguard Chinese national interests at any time. Hu also noted, "we should strive to build a powerful navy that adapts to the needs of our military's historical mission in this new century and at this new stageÉwe should make sound preparations for military struggles and ensure that the forces can effectively carry out missions at any time".

Meanwhile, reports suggest that as many as fourteen different classes of warships including nuclear submarines, are under construction at various shipyards in China. These include destroyers (Shenyang Lanzhou Guangzhou and Hangzhou Class - all above 6500 tons), frigates (Jiangkai and Type 054A Class), 093 SSN, 094 SSBN, Song, Yuanzheng and Yuan class SSK submarines, Type 072-II Class Large Amphibious assault ship (5,000 tons), Type 071 Class LPD Amphibious assault ship (17,000 tons) and Type 2208 Littoral Combat Ship.

The second development relates to the Indian navy. In early December 2006, Indian naval leadership announced that the navy was reshaping its force structure and as many as 42 naval platforms including two aircraft carriers (Vikramaditya [ex-Admiral Gorshkov] and the indigenously built Air Defence Ship), six submarines, eight maritime reconnaissance aircraft, more than a dozen rotary-wing unmanned aerial vehicles and several destroyers and frigates were awaiting delivery or at various stages of procurement or under construction. The development plans announced also include the acquisition of modern radars and satellite-based technology to support, either independent distant naval operations or in "conjunction with other friendly navies", the latter comment perhaps a cryptic allusion to a recent US announcement for a "1000-ship" force.

A cursory glance at the contours of the naval shipbuilding programmes of China and India suggest that these vessels and aircraft are certainly not for littoral operations, but rather power projection, designed to undertake long-range operations that could stretch the entire maritime swath from western Pacific Ocean through the Straits of Malacca into the Indian Ocean.

In the Indian context, the naval leadership has endowed upon the navy the new task of protecting India's energy sea-lane stretching from the Sakhalin Islands, off Russia's east coast to India. Significantly, the first consignment of 100,000 tons of crude oil from Sakhalin-I project, Russia, in which India's state owned oil company ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) has a 20% stake, was received at Manglore Port in December 2006. The Chinese leadership too has endorsed the development of a blue-water fleet to safeguard its territorial and maritime interests and to safeguard energy sea-lanes through the Indian Ocean that serve as the umbilical cord of the Chinese economy.

China and India are energy thirsty and seek energy resources the bulk of which must be transported via sea routes. Both countries are also conscious of the vulnerability of energy shipments through the sea-lanes, particularly in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean, Malacca Straits and South China Sea, that could arise from both state induced interruption or due to action by violent non-state actor. Significantly, these threats even prompted Chinese President Hu Jintao to state that China faces a "Malacca Dilemma".

Naval platforms will remain crucial to responding to different crisis in waters far away from home, and for both the Indian and Chinese navies, building a combat-capable fleet is very natural. Securing control and influence over the vulnerable sea-lanes is one of the main strategic objectives of the two navies and this strategic thinking is now based on exercising influence around the strategic choke points of the Strait of Malacca and the Straits of Hormuz.

India's expanding joint naval exercises with several South East Asian navies, South Korea and most importantly with Japan, has conveyed unambiguous signals to China. These have no doubt been in response to Chinese maritime access and basing strategies in South Asia with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Given the convergent strategic maritime operations geography of both Indian and Chinese navies, Southeast Asian waters are likely to emerge as a crucial node of confluence for their rising naval profiles. Both China and India are seeking influence and building their "forward naval presence" strategies to avert any maritime contingency in Straits of Malacca or South China Sea.

Although the United States continues to remain the preeminent maritime-naval power whose role in regional bilateral alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia could represent the levers of stabilisation, the Southeast Asian countries cannot afford not to factor the rising military profiles of China and India in their politico-strategic matrix. This provides the basis for defence transformation that should be viewed as integral to the combat effectiveness of their respective order-of battle.

The current naval acquisition trends in Southeast Asia are indicative of a transformation primarily driven by Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), optimal exploitation of information technology and the non-traditional threats arising from actions by violent non-state actors. But soon the region may witness transformation driven by forward naval presence of extra regional navies resulting in a desire to build a credible conventional deterrence.