When communist leader M K Pandhe warned that Muslims would dissert the Samajwadi Party if its leader Mulayam Singh Yadav supported the nuclear deal with the US, a long-held taboo was broken. The Politburo member of India’s largest communist party,  the Communist Party of India (Marxist), was saying that India's Muslim minority had a different take on the nuclear deal and would not take too kindly if their sentiments were ignored.

Although Pandhe immediately went into hibernation thereafter, his remarks brought into the open what has become common knowledge among serious observers of Indian foreign policy. While timing of Pandhe’s remarks raised many eyebrows, he was merely saying the obvious. Till that day, with the sole exception of former President A P J Abdul Kalam, no leading Muslim personality had spoken in favour of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Admired by millions of Indians, young and old alike, Kalam was never seen as a "Muslim leader", but a scientist who accidently became president due to the vagaries of the Indian political system.

Following Pandhe’s unexpected remarks, all the political parties quickly took refuge under the traditional umbrella of secularism; the critics argued that even Hindus were opposed to the nuclear deal, while supporters looked for those Muslims who would support the government especially during the crucial confidence vote on 22 July. Either way, the Muslim factor became prominent during the crucial two-day debate in the Lok Sabha. Both sides fielded Muslim speakers to buttress their respective positions while small and big parties looked for Muslim lawmakers to press the case.

The Muslim factor in India’s foreign policy is rarely spoken of in public. Since the early 1920s, Indian nationalists supported the Arabs in their conflict with the Jews over Palestine. Subsequently, India’s Middle East policy became overtly pro-Arab, a trend that continued until January 1992 when India normalised relations with the Israel. This policy has often been couched in terms of political considerations (anti-imperialism and Third World solidarity), moral arguments (national self-determination and secularism) or in terms of the national interest (economic interests and energy security).

However, it was not politically correct to accept the obvious. Given the historical heartache over the communal partition of the sub-continent in 1947, India and its leaders sought to cast their policies through a secular prism and rejected any suggestions of the Muslim factor determining its conduct. Such arguments were dismissed as rightwing conspiracies and a calculated attempt to ‘communalise’ foreign policy. However, this did not prevent India from privately adopting a different posture. Many Indian leaders including Nehru, were forthcoming in their interaction with Israeli officials.

Of late, Indian leaders have been more willing to accept the influence of domestic compulsions upon the conduct of its foreign policy. Speaking at a function in Jerusalem in the summer of 2000, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh admitted that an "unstated veto" of its domestic Muslim population was partly responsible for the delay in the establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel.

Separately, on the eve of the crucial vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) over the Iranian nuclear program, the Prime Minister conceded the Muslim factor. On 16 September 2006, with unusual candidness, he told reporters in New York that India’s decision at the IAEA would also be influenced by the Shia factor, since India had the “world’s second largest Shia population” after Iran.  

In the past, Indian leaders were reluctant to admit the Muslim factor, but the growing international controversy surrounding Iranian nuclear ambitions compelled even Congress leaders to shift tact. Not to be left behind, opposition parties held a massive rally in Lucknow, a major Shia centre in Northern India, a few months after Manmohan Singh's public comment in New York.

With Pandhe's revelation shortly before the 22 July vote, the communists have joined politically diverse voices in openly linking India's Muslims and the conduct of its foreign policy. To the casual observer however, the Pandora's Box was opened much earlier - the protest rallies held during the visit of President George Bush in March 2006 had an interesting twist - while the Communist parties hosted the ideological platform, various Muslim organisations provided foot soldiers. 

As a functioning democracy with a sizeable Muslim population, no government in India could ignore the influence of its Muslim constituency. Indifference towards their views and sentiment would undermine the country's democratic credentials.

Until now, the Muslim factor was considered relevant only insofar as India's Middle East policy was concerned. The debate over the nuclear vote has extended its scope to other aspects of Indian foreign policy. 

For too long, India and its leaders buried their heads in sand and avoided any public discussion of the role of  its Muslims in the formulation of foreign policy. Thanks to the debate emanating from the Indo-US nuclear deal, this is increasingly becoming tatamount to suicide, even for India's intellectuals.