On 22 March 2008, Ma Ying-jeou of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) won a strong mandate of 58 percent in Taiwan’s presidential election. Charismatic, athletic and articulate, Ma won on a platform of clean and good governance, and better ties with China, especially in the economic dimension.

Ma’s position towards Beijing is encapsulated in his three Nos: “No to reunification, no to de jure independence and no to war”. This policy is an affirmation of the status quo which was tolerable and acceptable to a majority of voters in Taiwan. Throughout the campaign, Ma was the frontrunner not only due to his charisma and track record as a mayor of Taipei city, but also because a majority of voters were fed up with the perceived corruption, nepotism and economic mismanagement of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Chen Shui-bien Administration. Ma’s opponent for the 2008 election, Frank Hsieh, did little to distance himself from the corrupt and unpopular Chen Shui bien during the campaign.

After losing the previous two presidential elections, the KMT has also adopted a populist campaign style similar to the DPP, including the local dialects of Minan and Hakka to appeal to voters. Arguably, the KMT, which hailed from Mainland China, has undergone a  “Taiwanisation” in its campaign style, manifesto and personnel to compete against the indigenous DPP which advocates Taiwanese identity and interests.

In concert, a majority of voters were not convinced by the DPP’s claims that Ma would sell out Taiwan to China including a proposed common market (which supposedly would lead to unemployment among many workers in Taiwan), that his loyalty was questionable for allegedly holding a green card since his student days in the US, and that Taiwan would end up oppressed and bloodied like Tibet if Ma were to win the election. Many voters did not buy the DPP’s argument that a KMT-controlled presidency along with a KMT-dominated legislature (where the party possesses three quarter of the seats) would lead to an erosion of democracy without the presidency checking the legislature.

However, the 2008 presidential election in Taiwan has a number of significance beyond the recapturing of executive power by the KMT.

First is the consolidation of democracy in Taiwan. The presidential election was conducted in a fair and peaceful way, and the results were graciously accepted by the losing candidate and his supporters --- a credit to the maturity of the electorate regardless of ideological hue.

Second, the rise in the Taiwan stock market on the Monday after the election was a harbinger of the island’s economic revitalisation. If Ma can make good his promise to establish direct links of travel between Mainland China and Taiwan, Chinese tourists and investments will be a tremendous boost to the Taiwanese economy, which has been in the doldrums in recent years.

Third, Ma’s presidency is likely to lead to better cross-strait relations because the KMT does not advocate de jure independence for Taiwan. To be sure, difficulties will lie ahead as Beijing and Taipei have to negotiate and work out the principles and practical modalities of direct links between them. The DPP as the opposition will scrutinise and criticise Ma’s rapprochement with the Mainland.

Even though the DPP tried to portray Ma as a “Trojan Horse” during the hustings, he had earlier condemned Beijing’s crackdown at the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and recent suppression of dissent in Tibet. Beijing has a four year window of opportunity to forge a modus vivendi with Taipei during Ma’s presidential term. If Beijing cannot secure an understanding with Taipei, then the chances of better ties are likely to be even more remote if a DPP candidate were to capture the presidency in 2012. Hopefully, pragmatism on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will see the successful implementation of direct links between them. If that were to come to fruition, a more peaceful environment in the Taiwan Strait will be good for East Asia’s stability too.

Fourth, better relations between Washington and Taipei can be anticipated. Indeed, bilateral ties were strained when Chen Shui-bien was perceived by the US to be antagonising Beijing unnecessarily, and undermining the status quo by seeking a referendum on the future of Taiwan. Washington already had enough problems with Iraq, Afghanistan and North Korea and had no wish to be distracted by tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Good relations with the US are critical to Taiwan because the former underwrites the island’s security within the framework of the Taiwan Relations Act. Presumably, Ma, a Harvard University graduate and a fluent English speaker, has a better understanding of the US than Chen Shui-bien, and will seek to restore good relations with Washington.

Fifth, and perhaps most intriguing is the claim by Ma that democracy in Taiwan is a good example for the Chinese speaking world such as Mainland China and Singapore to emulate (It is debatable whether Singapore is a member of the Chinese speaking world because it is a multi-ethnic nation, even though at least seventy five percent of its population comprises Singaporeans of Chinese descent).

Ma’s view is interesting and in contradiction to another outlook that China has a tradition and political culture of “chopping heads rather than counting hands”. Holders of this authoritarian outlook often believe that Asians who embrace democracy are naïve “Western” liberals who are 'out of sync' with the culture of their societies.

The jury is still out whether Ma will be able to lead Taiwan to greater heights and able to reconcile democratic consolidation, economic revitalisation, social justice and peace with China. If Taiwan can achieve these goals, then it will be a useful and attractive model not only to the Chinese speaking world, but other Asian countries too.