India-China relations have undergone several shifts since the momentum for peaceful relations and earnestness for good neighbourly relations commenced some years ago. The primacy of economic interdependence and the consensus to settle border/boundary disputes by the "Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question" was made by the visit of Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in April 2005. The agreement was followed by a joint statement that discussed the "Strategic and Cooperative Partnership" between India and China. Things have taken a different course since those bilateral highs.

On the surface, the 4056 km long (2520 miles) India-China frontier is normal and peaceful, yet deep signs of discord in bilateral relations have emerged due to Chinese interference in the Tawang district of India’s Arunachal Pradesh. 

Deng Xiaoping always advocated that contentious issues of the frontier should be left for future generations to resolve. India and China  began their institutional engagement of the Joint Working Group (JWG) discussions from 1988 and the Special  Representatives talks from 2003. However, all have gone ceremoniously with no substantive results except formal joint statements.

China’s strategy in the India-China border and boundary dispute is staightforward - freeze the issue to engage India economically so as to augment its own growth. The contentious issues would be raised when China finds necessary to contain India. However, Beijing has since been alarmed by the extent of India’s economic growth and rise and its closer relations with the United States, Japan and separately, with its engagement in East and Southeast Asia.

China has chosen the Tawang issue to be an issue of contention with India (in what otherwise could be pacific relations between the two powers) and has stoked the issue through its Ambassador in Delhi, and also prior to President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in 2006. It has played the Tawang card yet again during Manmohan Singh’s recent visit to China in January 2008 and again, during his visit to Arunachal Pradesh later that month.

China considers the Tawang district (thereby the whole of Arunachal Pradesh) of Arunachal Pradesh as part of the Tibetan state of the 6th Century. The irony has been that China had succeeded in securing India’s recognition of Tibet, while refusing to recognise Arunachal Pradesh as India’s sovereign territory. In astrategic barter trade-off, Beijing hopes that India would concede Arunachal Pradesh in return to Chinese “concessions” in Aksai-Chin and Sikkim.

Mao once described Tibet as China’s palm and that Nepal, Sikkim, NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh), Bhutan and Ladakh as its five fingers in South Asia. China’s strategy to contain India and enhance its South Asia domain has been evidenced through the development of an extensive multidimensional relationship with the states of South Asia, i.e., Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka.

Besides, it has developed extensive border infrastructure in Tibet with rail-road linkages and with border roads. China’s railway link from Golmud in Qinghai province to Lhasa in Tibet integrates Tibet more closely to the Chinese economy. Although ostensibly for domestic purposes, its impact and influence would increase China's influence in Nepal, Bhutan, and to the Northeast Indian states. With further extensions of the Golmud-Lhasa railway in the coming years to Nepal (with its new Maoist Government), the extensive instrastructure development will no doubt reinforce Beijing’s grip of the trans-Himalayan region’s resources and frontiers.

India has taken full cognisance of this situation and used PM Manmohan Singh’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh in late Janury 2008 to launch a comprehensive initiative to the tune of USD 10 billion to develop civilian and military infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh, in addition to implementing a fairly assertive strategy to secure its frontier. The appointment of General J.J.Singh, India’s former Chief of Army Staff as governor of the state and the announcement of development and infrastructure assistance to the state reinforces the assertive-imperative of New Delhi.

The recent opening in mid-April 2008 of the Daulat Beg Oldi airstrip in northern Ladakh overlooking the strategic Karakoram Pass is a short distance from the Chinese occupied Aksai-Chin area. India’s military responses have come in the light of China’s massive crash development of border infrastructure in the entire length of the Line of Actual Control of the western (Ladakh), middle (Uttarakhand and Himachal) and eastern (Sikkim and Arunachal) sectors.

Further, the Ministry of Defence decision to modernise and expand five "advanced standing grounds" into airfields in Arunachal Pradesh would be to augment its existing facilities in Itanagar. It is also developing a helipad as an advanced standing ground north of Leh and east of the Siachen Glacier in the Karakoram ranges. It has further plans to construct of greenfield civilian airports with dual civilian-military use.

Separately, India’s engagement with Myanmar in recent months have been marked by a strong sense of proaction. It singularly signals to Beijing that India has stepped up engagement in a domain of China’s core interests.  The visit of General Maung Aye, the second top ranking general of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in April 2008 confirmed Yangon’s engagement with India.

It also led to the conclusion of the agreement for India to "build, operate and use" port of Sittwe in the western Arakan province (bordering North East India) to develop navigation in the Kaladan River, navigable all the way up to the North Eastern state of Mizoram. In the process, this would involve upgrading highways in the remote territory connecting the rest of India's national network. This important development goes some way to reversing Myanmar’s decision to withdraw India's Gas Authority's "preferential buyer" status on certain offshore gas field blocks and instead sold them to rival PetroChina.

China’s rise to preeminence in Asia and its quest for resources, access and territory has even resulted in accusations of a neo-Hitlerian lebensraum that it is willing to use benign intent and mutual barter of territory for the next two decades before it could unleash its coercive power. 

India’s 7 May 2008 Agni III missile test indicates the persistence of India’s deterrent efforts to operationalise deployment of its land-based Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM). The recent announcement of yet another test launch of the Agni V with a 5000 KM radius would augment India’s IRBM and extended IRBM capabilities to create a sufficient detterance buffer.

In summary, the India-China competition with its positive accents in economic cooperation and bilateral trade has very clear competitive designs that cannot be overlooked. India’s scrupulous adherence to the agreements and statements have only been reciprocated by coercive and abrasive behavior from Beijing that is determined to reinforce its Tibet-Tawang connection.

While the economic cooperation dividend reveals a benign intent, the territorial dispute and claims by China in Tawang lays design to secure the Tawang tract by a blend of hard bargaining or even by a swift PLA surge from Tibet using its extensive border infrastructure. Both options have not been ignored by India or even other powers, who are not totally convinced by Beijing’s peaceful rise.