Asia’s powerhouse of the 1960s, long since bedevilled by domestic instability and economic insipidness has reason to cheer. The Philippines, formerly a robust treaty ally of the US, has found itself being wooed by China for economic influence and strategic leverage. Equally, the US has rekindled its strong ties with Manila especially after 9/11, albeit in the security realm more than anywhere else. Courted actively by the US and China in contest for influence in the Asia-Pacific, the Philippines has reason to feel chirpy about its re-emergence.

China’s initiatives both in terms of economic and infrastructure support has led to new alignments developing in mainland southeast Asia with countries like Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and to a lesser extent, Vietnam. Other ASEAN countries like Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia have long felt the influence of China’s growing economic clout and remain quietly weary of the Chinese economic vacuum, sucking up FDI that would traditionally have targeted them.

The Philippines has emerged as an important player on issues concerning South China Sea and to a lesser extent, US influence in the region. Though many commentators have lamented perceived US disinterest in the region, recent developments have evidenced new strategic permutations with regard to the relationship between the US and the Philippines.

The Mischief Reef incident in 1995 and the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1996 confirmed the likelihood of China emerging as a strategic challenge in the region. The Filipino response was to endorse the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with US in 1999 presaging a security buffer in the process.

But the scenario changed in the aftermath of 9/11 when US initiated its Global War on Terror. At around the same time, China decided to proceed with its charm offensive, not just within the ASEAN region, but globally as well. Initially it pursued a time-tested version of aid diplomacy, supplying non-lethal military equipment, and transport vehicles to the Philippines. In addition, China courted support of Vietnam and the Philippines in the joint exploration of resources in South China Sea, a noteworthy confidence-building initiative.

After 9/11, the US assisted the Philippines through joint training, military aid, intelligence sharing initiatives, and since early 2007, has also provided more logistical support for counter terrorism operations. The initiatives taken by US have seen the arrest and death of major terrorist leaders, although there are no clear indications regarding the relative success of these operations. However, there also were instances of a difference of opinion in US-Philippine relations, when the Philippines withdrew its troops from Iraq in 2004, in the wake of the abduction of a Filipino truck driver there.

Given the context of the US presence in the Philippines, it is moot that China has been raising apprehensions over the role of US presence in not just the Philippines, but also the region in general. At the same time, countries like Singapore and even Indonesia have expressed concerns about the reducing US interest in the region most recently manifested by the absence of Condoleezza Rice during the recently concluded ASEAN Security Forum meeting.

But if one considers the US initiatives in the 2007 then it shows that US is reframing its Asia-Pacific security policy with a view to address, the military rise of China, and to a lesser extent, to deal with new vistas with regard to the global war on terror. In the case of the Philippines, the US has declared that apart from extending logistical support to the Philippine army against insurgent and terror hideouts in Mindanao, it would construct makeshift camps and bases for its forces to the tune of US$14.4 million. While not as definitive as the purpose of Subic and Clark during the heyday of the Cold War, 2007 has witnessed a significant ramping up of Philippines-US relations that are likely to continue steadily for the foreseeable future.

The Philippines more recently has been negotiating with China on the issue of fishing in the waters of South China Sea and has proposed a fishing corridor in South China Sea. China also is trying to woo Philippines through its military aid in the form of dump trucks, bull dozers and heavy vehicles for military use. Though the move is seen as a Chinese charm offensive - although viewed by some security specialists as balancing US efforts in Philippines, which has included substantial assistance in the form of infrastructure and other social services in Mindanao.

China's “softly-softly” approach has so far worked to avoid a significant signature unlike US manoeuvres that reached a nadir when US soldiers raped a Filipino woman on the sidelines of bilateral exercises in 2005. US reluctance to hand over the criminal soldiers added to the local resentment. But China too has not escaped the wrath of the Filipino public, especially over business deals gone awry.

It is unlikely that either the US or China will be willing to loosen its foothold in Philippines. China is leaving no stone unturned in maintaining an influence in Philippines, best manifested by the number of visits made by the Philippine President to China over the last few years. These have been most recently been reciprocated by the visit of the Chinese defence minister to the Philippines in early Sep 2007 and a business delegation.

All said, the diplomatic posturing between the US and China over the Philippines is underwritten by a sense that neither of the two want to create a sense of insecurity in the region. In that regard, the Philippines is likely to be the ultimate beneficiary of the China-US jostle.  The domestic impediments to US involvement in the Philippines have a long history. China is trail-blazing a more sophisticated and engaging form of diplomacy that is more likely to reap dividends in the medium to long run, as it is not chiefly because it is predicated a variety of issues and not on security concerns alone.