The Indo-US nuclear deal will be remembered as the bench mark event in Indian politics in recent history - if there was any reminder needed of how tenuous governance can be in world�s largest democracy - this was it. There is no doubt that the successful conclusion of this deal will enhance India�s credibility in South Asia and eventually see the country displace Pakistan as the US's preferred ally of choice in the region.

Nonetheless, this deal has fermented a serious political crisis in India. There are indications that the present United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government may not last its full term of five years because of the opposition of the left parties. In the event of a no confidence motion on this issue, the UPA government is most likely to collapse if the support of the left parties is withdrawn. But no party is yet ready to call anyone�s bluff, especially since making the 123 Agreement an election issue does not guarantee victory for anyone.

Nonetheless, the deadlock over nuclear agreement with the US has rendered the situation precarious. Public opinion at least in urban India is divided, both for and against. Those, persuaded by the argument of the leftist parties, believe that with the acceptance of this deal, India will become a US stooge abdicating its independence in foreign policy matters, amongst others. Hence the 123 Agreement amounts to India�s abject surrender to a power that behaves colonially in the international realm.

A corollary argument hinges around apprehension that the deal is a part of a strategic design that began with the erstwhile former BJP-led NDA government and is being pursued most vigorously by the current UPA government. With the signing of the agreement, India will formally become a member of a quasi-military alliance not just the US, but also other countries, such as Australia, Japan and Singapore. This will obviously have an adverse impact on India's sovereignty, independent foreign policy and relations with other Asian neighbours.

However, the sharpest criticisms have come from the CPI (M) and other left parties accusing the UPA government of deceiving its partners in the ruling coalition. Critical of the agreement, Prakash Karat, the CPI (M) general secretary was not persuaded by the argument that nuclear cooperation would help India meet its energy needs given the limited contribution that nuclear power makes to India�s overall energy generation today, a figure that hovers around three percent.

Besides, what is most disturbing, as Karat underlines, are the terms and conditions of the recently-adopted Hyde Act by the US Congress in December, 2006 that includes provisions imposing restrictions on transfer of technology and also barring access to dual use technologies. The left's concern is also based on the fact that the Hyde Act contains directions pursuant to India's foreign policy and other security-related matters. There are nine references to India's support to US policy on Iran. For the Prime Minister, the 123 Agreement represents "a great opportunity" that will enable India to sustain the annual growth rate of 9 to 10 percent by "doubling the growth of her nuclear power".

In his opinion, it remains wrong to identify 123 Agreement with the Hyde Act which falls within the internal jurisdiction of the US. The 123 Agreement, by allowing India to separate its civil and military programmes, effectively makes India free to exercise her nuclear option internationally. Hence, it is anything but a constraint on India's foreign policy. Instead, it represents a quantum jump from a position of nuclear isolation to a considerable degree of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy which would enable India to meet its power needs without significantly restricting its strategic and foreign policy options.

The Prime Minister also defended his government by asserting that the opposition to the nuclear deal amounts to blackmailing by the left partners of the UPA, as they did not question the agreement when it was signed in January 2006. Whatever the relative merits of the contrasting arguments, the fact remains that the political fallout from the 123 Agreement has put the survival of the government at stake.

In a sense, the UPA's success in the foreign policy realm has turned tragic since the left parties seem to be determined in extracting its pound of flesh from the government by threatening to withdraw from the ruling coalition. The leading partner of the UPA, the Congress, cannot afford to ignore the threat since it cannot, with 145 seats in parliament, muster a majority without the support of the 61 members of parliament of the left parties. There is no way out, it seems, because the major opposition party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), with 138 members of parliament also, in a display of real political skullduggery, aggressively attacked the nuclear deal as "a sell-out of national interests" and of the strategic nuclear programme.

In fact, the left has reportedly undertaken preparations for a mid-term poll in which the 123 Agreement will figure prominently as a major election issue. By repeatedly asking the government to shelve the 123 Agreement, it hinted at serious consequences for the government and the country and subsequently announcing that its support was contingent upon the government not proceeding further with the deal, clearly revealing that its differences with the government were serious enough to withdraw from it.

The government decision to appoint a committee to look into the issues raised by the left, may have pleased opponents to the deal, but it has also created a do or die situation for the left. Given the hype the left created on the nuclear deal, it may not be easier for the leftist parties to uncritically accept the government decision to go ahead with the Indo-US nuclear deal. That will dilute their anti-imperial ideological stance which always pays electoral dividends in West Bengal, Kerala and Tripura where the left parties have a strong organisational base. In case, the left parties agree to support the government on this issue, the BJP will reap the maximum benefit by projecting itself as the only party opposed to imperial encroachment with regard to India's sovereignty.

So for the left, this is a serious dilemma from which there is hardly a respectable escape route. The current imbroglio also presents an opportunity for the government to project its strength vis-a-vis its coalition partners. The government is likely to survive this crisis because the left parties may not be so belligerent given the growing consolidation of the BJP in recently concluded by-elections in India, and the reality that this strength is likely to eat into the left's constituencies.

Secondly, the left are not as united as assumed - their constituent parties have not arrived at a consensus on 123 Agreement. The chasm between the West Bengal unit of CPI (M) and its central counterpart on the issue of withdrawal of support from the government on the nuclear deal has shown clearly differences within the party. It does appear that since the Indo-US nuclear deal may not be a sustainable electoral issue, the left parties have decided that fresh elections at this stage are pointless.

With the BJP ready for an election, the oft-dependable slogan that "secularism is in danger" may give the left parties more political mileage at the hustings than dissatisfaction over the 123 Agreement. The next general election, whenever it is held, will be fought on bread and butter issues - politics in India is not necessarily a case of "what you see is what you get". India's present political scenario may certainly be volatile, but not clear enough to suggest that a Lok Sabha election is round the corner.