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Mr. Ban’s attempt to tackle sensitive political issues that touch the regime’s nerves on the raw may destroy rather than achieve the hope to “consolidate and build on the joint humanitarian efforts following Cyclone Nargis last year” expressed in the news conference in Japan. Instead of being able to “push the reset button” as suggested by historian Thant Myint-U, the UNSG could end up pressing the ‘delete’ button wiping out any goodwill and progress achieved through the UN humanitarian effort for Nargis. This would be tantamount to forsaking the victims of Nargis. At this stage, having publicly committed to raise those three issues as imperatives for national reconciliation, Mr. Ban has no choice but to press ahead. Mr Ban’s message to the generals may be more palatable should he present it not as a demand but as friendly advice for the regime and Myanmar. The continuation of full UN support for post-Nargis reconstruction also needs to be delinked from the national reconciliation agenda.
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To be sure, in deference to WTO obligations, India might make small trade concessions to China. But overall, India-China commerce will suffer because of their strategic competition, and contrary to conventional thinking, the loser may not be India if it learns its Chinese lessons correctly.
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This is the first time China presented the U-shaped line to a UN body in the context of maritime delimitation. This qualitatively changes the status of the U-shaped line to a claim to the waters, the seabed and the subsoil within that line. Southeast Asia and the world’s major seafaring states should be concerned by this development.
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China appeared to exorcise the ghost of Tiananmen with double-digit growth. Double-digit inflation presents a more challenging starting point for Iran. The bigger question of the Islamic state’s ability to accommodate modern, diverse and even contentious politics, flummoxes even more.
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Beijing’s calculations on how to deal with North Korea are not aligned with expectations that it could and should use its leverage to exert pressure on Pyongyang. The problem is that China is concerned that it could well lose whatever leverage it has. Beijing is also afraid of the uncertainties that could result, and that the outcomes may actually undermine its national security interests.
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